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1. J. David Richardson
International Coordination of Trade Policy
3.1 Introduction and Overview
Thepost-WorldWarII recordofsovereigngovernmentscoordinating
their international trade policies is really quite impressive. Yet it seems
recently to have lost the luster that characterized its early life. Some
recentinitiatives have seemed to cartelize ratherthan liberalize. Others
have failed to achieve coordination ofany kind, dissolving in disarray.
Fears cannot easily be calmed that the conventions and structures of
postwar trade policy coordination are crumbling. Open hostility, mil-
itary metaphors, and an air offrontier vigilantism are today quite com-
mon in trade policy discussions.
International trade policy coordination has clearly become more dif-
ficult. The postwar hegemonic environment has evolved into a more
general strategic environment with several influential governments and
blocs. New patterns of initiative and response have been slow to de-
velop. New temptations have arisen for governm~nts to abandon seem-
ingly outdated conventions of cooperation, causing the system to re-
treat toward uncoordinated hostility. The growth of administered
protection, aggressive reciprocity, and selectivity all illustrate this
evolution.
Internationaltrade policy coordinationis further complicatedby eco-
nomic developments. Some make a country's comparative advantage
increasingly sensitive to sectoral predation by others, especially through
subsidies and performance requirements aimed at multinational firms.
Workers and others correspondingly bear the burdens of sharper ad-
justments and look to government to turn its trade policy narrowly
inward in orderto easetheirload. Such "domestication" oftrade policy
is the antithesis ofinternational coordination.
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What changes might restore the liberalizing impetus ofpostwar trade
policy coordination at its best? Several are considered in this paper.
One is to extend the "Codes" approach to multilateral negotiations
under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The Sub-
sidies Code in particular seems ripe for refining, and ideas for devel-
opment of a Safeguards Code are assessed. Standing GATT commit-
tees, with representative membership and regular meetings, are
discussed, as are several ways that their independent leadership might
be enhanced. A case is made that European and Japanese capacity to
initiate coordinated liberalization is much greater and more promising
than is generally acknowledged, as is that ofeven quite small countries
in "minilateral" settings. Discreet preferential coordination is viewed
as a way to rebuild trust and to write new rules and establish new
precedents in administrative trade policy-rules and precedents that
could eventually come to be accepted even by currently combative
countries.
Many reflections in this paper are framed in categories from re(.,ent
economic thinking about policy coordination in "strategic" environ-
ments-those with small numbers of self-consciously interdependent
agents. I am hopeful that commentators on this paper will provide
balancing admixtures of complementary perspective, institutional de-
tail (e.g., beyond GATT), and operationalfeasibility. They will no doubt
also provide important insights on other trade policy issues, not all of
which concern coordination. Readers with limited interest in an intro-
duction to strategic perspectives should find it easy to skim section 3.2
and read section 3.3 with more care.
At the cost of lengthening the discourse, I have tried to make it
minimally "acronomyous." Thus I have resisted adopting IPC (eye-
pick), ITPC (it-pick), and NITPC (nit-pick) as shorthand for interna-
tional (trade) policy coordination or lack thereof. At the cost of ex-
posing my ignorance, I have tried to draw a few insights from game
theory, political science, history, and law. The nature ofthe topic seemed
to compel it. I suspect I will be thanked for the first; I hope I can be
forgiven for the second.
3.2 Postwar Trade Policy Coordination in Strategic Perspective
It seems quite natural to address a paper on economic coordination
to international trade policy. It is a border policy that discriminates
between foreign and domestic residents in goods and services trans-
actions. Thus it always involves at least two countries and govern-
ments. There are many varieties oftrade policy. Free trade is properly
understood as the absence ofany domestic/foreign discrimination (not
the absence of government regulation), and national treatment as the169 Trade Policy
absence of any added discrimination once border barriers have been
"cleared." Most-favored-nation (MFN) treatment is the absence of
discrimination among foreign residents of differing nationalities, and
tariffs are discriminatory taxes.
Because trade policy always involves choices concerning interna-
tional discrimination, it is fitting to askabout trade policy coordination,
or its lack. Rules, aggression, unfair treatment, and similar terms all
have natural usefulness in discussing trade policy.
At first blush, monetary and fiscal policies seem different from trade
policy; they are really not. Monetary, fiscal, and trade policies all have
discriminatory border effects that are quite similar. Monetary structure
is a quintessential border policy, delineating regions of differing legal
tender. Many taxes fall on residents ofone country but not others. The
ratio of government to private purchases can affect an economy's in-
ternal price ratio of domestic to foreign goods just like trade policy,
because government purchases are usually concentrated on domestic
goods. These similarities suggest that students of trade policy coor-
dination and students ofmacroeconomic policy coordination have les-
sons to learn from each other. 1
3.2.1 Retrospective Insights from a Simple Structure
The word "coordinate" is defined by Webster as "to bring into a
common action, movement, or condition: regulate and combine in har-
monious action: HARMONIZE." The key words in the definition suggest
interdependence and mutuality. When applied to trade policy, the idea
ofcoordination suggests both that each country's government fashions
its policy conscious of its effect on other governments' trade policies
and that the intended outcome is mutually advantageous to all.
Interdependence and mutuality are hardly revolutionary traits. They
have permeated the past forty years of trade agreements among gov-
ernments, most significantly under GATT. Interdependence and mu-
tuality grew out ofabhorrence ofthe consequences ofworld economic
war followed by full-scale world war. 2
Today there is a malaise thatinterdependenceand mutuality are being
abandoned world-wide, especially in the United States. Interdependent
consciousness is on the defensive ("other countries be damned, we've
got to do something about our trade deficit"), and mutuality is waning
("we've let ourselves passively be pushed around long enough; now
it's time to teach those guys a lesson").
Are there good reasons for malaise? Is the future for trade policy
coordination quite bleak? If so, is that so bad?
It is remarkable that the most familiar economic apparatus for ana-
lyzing trade policy is ill-suited for answering these questions because
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governments. Coordination questions arise only in "strategic environ-
ments." These insights were obscured in the early postwar period by
the dominance ofthe United States in global trade. Yet even that period
can be instructively described from strategic perspectives (see section
3.3.1).
Strategic environments are those in which the number of economic
agents making interdependent decisions is relatively small. Each agent
takes into account some counterresponse from rivals in calculating its
best course of action. Actions include threats and promises, bluster
and bluff, collaboration and commitment, all aimed at influencing the
outcome of an endeavor toward one's own objectives. These are fa-
miliar features ofgames, war, and policy coordination. They have little
place in the environment traditionally employed by economists to ana-
lyze trade policy.
In the perfectly competitive environment, each ofmany agents con-
siders itselftoo small to influence market outcomes and, therefore, too
small to be noticed. Each, therefore, makes choices assuming that all
rivals' variables are given. Governments in the traditional framework
are independent. They presume that their policies affect market equi-
librium butdo notaccountfor the way that they may affect the behavior
of other governments.3 When agents take their rivals' actions to be
immutable, strategic behavior plays no role, and coordination cannot
even be characterized. Furthermore, there are only weak analytical
defenses for trade policy of any sort except free trade.
Thus the analysis ofpolicy coordination must begin in strategic en-
vironments.4 The "prisoner'sdilemma" modeloftable 3.1 is a primitive
strategic environment from which to draw some simple first insights
about historic trade policy coordination. One is that uncoordinated
trade policy-policy that independently takes other countries' policy
strategies as given-can lead to an outcome that, although rationally
Table 3.1 Gains and Losses from Alternative Trade Policies in a "Prisoner's
Dilemma" Model
"Their" Nation's Trade Policy









+ 1 for us
+ 1 for them
+ 3 for us





- 2 for us
+ 3 for them
- 1 for us
- 1 for them171 Trade Policy
chosen, is unfortunate in the retrospective evaluation ofeach govern-
ment. Each would prefer the cooperative outcome, but some form of
coordination is necessary to attain and maintain it, specifically some
communication and guarantee that each government will "play" the
cooperative initiative and not "cheat." Without such a guarantee, un-
coordinated national self-interest suggests that each government play
noncooperatively. Each will be better off whether rival governments
do the same (''we" would lose - 1 instead of - 2) or try to cooperate
(we gain 3 instead of 1). Without coordination the grim outcome is
trade war, well illustrated by the early 1930s.
The outcome ofuncoordinated policy is less grim in a succession of
encounterslike thatmodeled in table 3.1. Experienceand analysis show
that a good uncoordinated trade policy strategy (called "tit for tat") is
to play cooperatively unless cheated, then to retaliate (play noncoop-
eratively), but only once until cheated again.5 Nevertheless, it is ob-
vious that a succession ofcoordinated cooperative outcomes would be
even better for each country than "tit for tat," or certainly no worse.
Thus coordination still looks desirable for the richer, dynamic version
of this model.
The past forty years provide many illustrations ofboth the apparent
desirability of coordination and what helps to attain it.
Coordination Compacts
GATT is a fine illustration of a compact in which governments co-
ordinate by: (1) negotiating rules ofcooperative play (e.g., "fair trade"),
defining noncoordination (e.g., "nullification and impairment") and
potential penaltiesfor noncooperation (e.g., compensation, retaliation);
and (2) exchanging pledges ofcooperative behavior (by becoming sig-
natories) and agreeing thereby to consult and ultimately to accept the
stipulated penalties ifthey violate their pledge. Penalties for noncoop-
Table 3.2 "Gains" and "Losses" from Alternative Trade Policies with a
Hostile Opponent for the Same Prisoner's Dilemma Model
"Their" Nation's Trade Policy
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eration are complemented by rewards for cooperation, often involving
redistribution (side payments) of the collective gains. In GATT such
redistribution is reflected in the principle of reciprocity introduced in
its Preamble (in practice~w-.the value ofconcessions offered and advan-
tages received should be approximately equal) and also in the major
exception to that principle (developing countries are freed from strict
reciprocity in order to redistribute gains toward them-implicitly the
side payment for their continued cooperation).
In brief, GATT is a compact that establishes communication and
conventions to facilitate coordination. A tighter compact might also
have establishedaninstitutionthatmonitors and/orpolices trade policy,
with independent power to reward cooperation and penalize noncoop-
eration. This GATT is not, except for very limited monitoring. It con-
trasts with the International Monetary Fund (IMF), which is a quasi-
independent (yet representative) institution with greater ability to
monitor (surveillance)6 and limited powers to police (quota require-
ments, interest charges and payments, conditionality, limits on cu-
mulative access). Had the International Trade Organization (ITO) not
been aborted in 1950 (see Diebold 1952), the institutional support for
trade policy coordination might be closer today to that for monetary
coordination. (Whether this would necessarily be a "good" thing is
another question entirely and will be addressed below.)
Common Objectives
Communication, conventions, compacts, and coordinating institu-
tions come about only if there is enough mutual agreement among
governments on objectives. Such agreement might be said to be a
primordial condition for coordination devices to be attractive (see Cooper
1986, 1987) and was quite influential in the postwar design of GATT.
Governments were nearly unanimous in their attraction to cooperative
outcomes.?
This impetus for coordination can vanish, however, if mutuality of
objectives is undermined, as may be happening today. The structure
oftable 3.1 provides a simple illustration. Suppose "their" government
were to become determinedly hostile to "ours," even to the point of
valuing our loss as much as their gain.8 The implied objective for them
would become the difference in their payoff and ours in table 3.1:
+ 3 - (-2), -1 - (-1), - 2 - (+3), and + 1 - (+ 1), moving
clockwise from the northeast quadrant. The new payoffmatrix is given
in table 3.2. Its innovation is that there is no longer any attraction for
the hostile government to choose cooperative trade over trade war.
Perceived gains are 0 in either case. Coordination may be infeasible
because it takes two to make peace, but only one to break it.
The difference-in-objectives problem obviously grows worse ifboth
governments are hostile toward each other.9 Then goals are inconsis-173 Trade Policy
tent, and neithergovernment sees any attraction in coordinating. Trade
wars like the 1930s are more enduring than under simple uncoordinated
policy because they cannot be shaken by any mere provision ofinfor-
mation, institutional reform, encouragement, or exhortation. What is
needed before these devices can be used is stabilization 'of hostility
(cease-fire), then reconciliation if possible-ideas that are reflected in
the GATT principles of "standstill" and "rollback." Without genuine
standstill and rollback, coordination for mutual gain is as impossible
among hostile trade negotiators as it was between the Hatfields and
McCoys!10
One general lesson of postwar coordination is that it is very tough
among agents with different objectives and may be impossible among
agents with inconsistent objectives. A corollary is that momentum to-
ward coordination can be maintained by limiting the scope for coop-
erative initiative to like-minded trading partners, thereby isolating hos-
tile ones. 11 Correspondingly, an organization of sufficiently hostile
governments can easily become paralyzed with an inadequate constit-
uency for any attempt to reclaim or enhance coordination. The view
that GATT has reached this point is evaluated below.
Common Structural Understanding
Agreementon objectives is, in turn, possible only ifthere is sufficient
common understanding among governments on the payoffs to alter-
native trade policy initiatives and, therefore, on the structure ofworld
trade that links policy to payoffs. Such common understanding might
be said to be a "pre-primordial" condition for coordination devices to
be attractive.
In this regard, it is sobering to consider how ill-developed is profes-
sional consensus on empirical models ofglobal trade patterns and the
effects of trade policy-ill-developed even in comparison to empirical
models of global macroeconomics (e.g., the IMF's multilateral ex-
change rate model), which are widely acknowledged to have their own
distinct problems. Itis arrestingto learnfrom macroeconomic research,
such as Frankel (1986) and Frankel and Rockett (1986), that when
models differ across participants, policy coordinationfails to improve
macroeconomic performance almost as often as it succeeds. Similarly
arresting is Baldwin and Clarke's (1985) finding that noncooperative
solutions to conflict over alternative Tokyo Round tariff-cutting for-
mulae seemed superior for all protagonists to the compromise formula
that actually emerged from coordinated negotiation. 12
3.2.2 Deeper Dimensions ofPostwar Trade Policy Coordination
Trade policy coordination is, ofcourse, much more subtle and com-
plex than suggested in the preceding account. There are at least four
deeper dimensions: scope, virtue, instrument, and motive force.174 J.D. Richardson/R.S. Strauss/Me Kunihiro/E.T. Pratt, Jr.
Scope
Prospects for trade policy coordination and its outcome depend very
much on its scope. Scope has three important variants. Geographical
scope determines which governments are involved, whether coordi-
nation is multilateral, "minilateral," or bilateral-involving all trading
partners, some, or only one.
Mutuality/hostility, as described above, is one criterion for deter-
mining the most promising geographical scope for coordination efforts.
It also influences the choice ofsubstantive scope and sectoral scope-
what issues are to be covered, and for what sectors. Postwar trade
policy coordination has emphasized trade in manufactured commodi-
ties, in part because trade in agriculture, services, corporate capital
(e.g., investment, rights of establishment), and labor effort (e.g., im-
migration, guest workers) were inflammatory by comparison. Coor-
dination was pursued on substance and in sectors where mutuality was
feasible; substance and sectors where hostility reigned were isolated.
By comparison to postwartrends, mutuality seems more feasible today
for trade in some services, some corporate capital, and perhaps certain
agricultural sectors. But international hostility seems to have grown in
standardized labor-intensive manufactures such as textiles/apparel and
basic metals.
Another criterion for determining the most promising scope for
coordination is the "fluidity of side payments," how easy it is to
exchange concessions on one issue with one trading partner for ad-
vantages on another issue with another trading partner. Recent trade
policy coordination has employed two principles to enhance fluidity.
One is across-the-board bargaining, with limited exceptions lists, which
allows for concessions and advantages to be exchanged fluidly from
sector to sector. An older principle is nondiscrimination (as defined
by MFN, concessions must be offered to all trading partners, notjust
some), which allows for "inequities" in some bilateral tally ofconces-
sions and advantages to be offset fluidly by "windfalls" in some
other. 13 It is obvious how important it is for fluid side payments to
have common understanding among governments on payoffs and the
underlying structure (model) of trade, as· described above. Otherwise
measures of concessions and advantages are wildly different among
participants.
There is unavoidable tension between these criteria for scope. Cau-
tion to avoid hostile undermining of coordination encourages narrow
scope; concern to lubricate the distribution of benefits from coordi-
nation encourages wide scope. Deep pockets capable of making lots
of change sometime disintegrate from its weight. 14175 Trade Policy
Virtue
Policy coordination by itselfmay have little value independent ofits
"virtue." The case for coordination is probably strongest where the
case for policy intervention itself is strongest and weaker elsewhere.
Thus, in public health (Cooper 1986), where externalities and inter-
national spillovers are clear and even quantifiable, the case for coor-
dination is strong. In influencing the sectoral/industrial structure, how-
ever, where the case for government policy is less universally
acknowledged, the case for coordination is weaker. This perspective
may help to explain why the IMF found readier approval in the United
States after World War II than did the ITO; there was readier approval
at that time of an active role for government in macroeconomics than
in microeconomics.
This lesson has been blurred in recent commentary on trade policy.
There is an unwarranted tendency to believe that international policy
coordination is by its very nature "good" and to neglect the possibility
that uncoordinated unilateral policy may be "better." Virtue and co-
ordination do not necessarily go hand in hand. IS Language alone pro-
vides a way to appreciate this. Almost any outcome described as co-
ordinated or cooperative could also be described as collusive. Almost
any outcome described as uncoordinated (or chaotic!) could be de-
scribed as competitive. Exactly the same formal structure supports
types ofcoordination ofvery different timbre: coordination that signals
harmonious forums full ofrespectfulgive-and-take in the mutual pursuit
of noble goals; and collusion that sounds like closed, mean-spirited
cartels which victims deride as vicious old-boy networks. It is all too
easy to slip into the benign belief that the objective of government is
the "public good," so that coordinated pursuit ofthat good is good in
itself and to be desired. It is all too easy to forget public choice and
other grounds for skepticism that government's objectives are prima
facie good, on which coordinated pursuit of dubious objectives be-
comes doubly dubious. 16
Postwar trade policy provides many illustrations. A traditional de-
fense ofMFN treatment is that it constrains the formation ofpredatory
and other "bad" coalitions (coordinations) of trading partners; legiti-
mate customs unions and free trade areas are, however, excused from
MFN because these coalitions are on balance "good" (liberalizing). It
is arguable that international policy coordination has beenjust as thor-
ough and strong in the recent cartelization ofglobal steel trade and the
market-sharing negotiated under successive Multi-Fiber Arrangements
as it was in the Toyko, Kennedy, and earlierrounds ofGATT-sponsored
trade negotiations. Voluntary export restraints are bilateral examples176 J.D. Richardson/R.S. Strauss/Me Kunihiro/E.T. Pratt, Jr.
of deliberalizing coordination. Their ambiguous name has merit, though;
they do involve a side payment (compensation) to the "offending"
parties in order to maintain coordination-the implicit "quota rents"
(Deardorff 1986). Although deliberalizing, they are nevertheless co-
operative and thus not as hostile as a unilateral protective counter
against an import surge.
Concerns about virtue would be mere fretting ifthe size ofthe gains
or losses from coordination were small. I? Some empirical research
seems to suggest that these gains and losses are indeed small. Deardorff
and Stern (1984) find that the economic welfare gains from theelimi-
nation ofall post-Tokyo Round tariffs are infinitesimal. Whalley (1985,
180-84) finds that the gains from elimination of tariffs and all other
deliberalizing post-TokyoRoundtrade barriersareless than0.5 percent
of world income. Kreinin (1974, chap. 3) estimates the gains to the
original six members ofthe European Economic Community (EEC) as
around 1.5 percent of their 1970 national income, but MacBean and
Snowden (1981, chap. 8) find the estimate diminished as the EEC ex-
panded to nine members due to losses from the Common Agricultural
Policy (itself arguably an example of deliberalizing coordination).
These calculations are misleadingly small estimates, however, ofthe
gains from maintaining the status-quo level ofcoordination relative to
trade war. They estimate instead the difference between the status quo
andfree trade. Ifthe real status quo is far to the right along a continuum
running from "trade war" to "free trade," then the measured gains to
further "virtuous" coordination will be small, but the potential losses
from failure of existing coordination or from extreme deliberalizing
coordination might be huge. In the famous (infamous?) bicycle meta-
phor of trade policy coordination, there may be little additional mo-
mentum to squeeze into a bicycle cruising reasonably close to its max-
imum speed, but a great deal ofmomentum to lose ifthe bicycle were
to fall down. Or, it's a long way down the slippery slope to the valley
when you're close to the peak.
Whalley (1985), in fact, estimates both kinds ofgains and losses. His
very rough calculations ofthe losses from trade war relative to status-
quo coordination appear in table 3.3. They are surprisingly large, es-
pecially for Europe and Japan; five to ten times larger than the gains
to be achieved from further "virtuous" coordination.
For reasons described in section 3.3, preserving the virtue ofcurrent
coordination is the modern trade policy challenge, not perfecting it.
Table 3.3 suggests that this challenge does indeed have quantitative
importance for the entire world.
Instrument
Another deeper dimension oftrade policy coordination is the choice
of instruments relied on to encourage it. Here the most important177 Trade Policy
Table 3.3 Percent of GNP Lost due to Multilateral Trade Warsa
















Source: Whalley (1985, 248).
aAverage of compensating variations (CV) and equivalent variations (EV).
bRates assessed to all imports in presence ofexisting nontariff barriers and factor taxes.
cApparent optimal tariff against the aggregate of all other trading regions assuming no
retaliation.
distinction is between rules and discretion. At one extreme the com-
pacts ofcoordination may attempt to legislate meticulous rules that the
institutions of coordination correspondingly adjudicate. At the other
extreme, the compacts may simply specify regular meetings for com-
munication that the institutions convene and inform. Policy coordi-
nation via the Bank for International Settlements and the June summit
meetings have the latter spirit; GATT historically has the former.
Reliance on rules makes most sense when issues and policies can be
reasonably defined and measured. Otherwise rules require immense
resources to draft and monitor and can easily appear arbitrary and
inequitable. Discretion, discussion, diplomacy, and entreaty are often
more productive and cost-effective when issues and policies are hard
to define and measure. 18 In this light one can interpret GATT's historic
rules-centeredness as fitting the historic reliance of the world on ob-
jectively measurable tariffs and quotas. GATT tariff bindings are in
fact an excellent example of a rule aimed at avoiding surreptitious
cheating on the compacts of coordination. (Such rules are known as
"credible precommitments" in the language of strategic policy coor-
dination.) One can correspondingly defend the more consultative flavor
oftheTokyo Round's codes for nontariffmeasures as fitting the world's
relative shift toward administrative policy instruments (see table 3.7
and the surrounding discussion).
It is instructive along these lines to wonder ifthe Toyko Round code
dealing with the most measurable nontariff measure, subsidies, has
been generally regarded as the least successful code precisely because
it could have gone further toward definition, measurement, and rules.
The problems ofcommon objectives and structural understanding, dis-
cussed above, are admittedly severe in coordinating rules on subsidies.
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and countervail them seem inevitable (Shuman and Verrill 1984). The
idea of a coordinated defining and "binding" of subsidies, much as
tariffs are "bound" in the GATT, is considered below.
Motive Force
Impetus is another aspect of policy coordination not captured in
simple accounts. Coordination can be imposed, agreed, or implicitly
chosen, with varying implications along a continuum that joins them.
Coordination is imposed when weaker, smaller, or less-skilled agents
harmonize their policies with those ofa strong, large, or skilled agent,
which tailors its policy to elicit policy response among the followers
that furthers its own goals. Coordination is agreed when enough con-
sensus exists on objectives and structure among agents ofcomparable
strength that they negotiate a compact. Coordination can be implicitly
chosen even in the absence of a compact (or with an ineffective one)
when agents recognize at least some gain from mutually cooperative
outcomes and some penalty from cheating, as in the conceptofimplicit
collusion among oligopolistic producers. In this light, early GATT co-
ordination of trade policy might illustrate the imposing force of a heg-
emonic United States; Kennedy Round coordination might illustrate
explicit agreement among equals; and current coordination might il-
lustrate the kind ofimplicitimpetus thatis maintained solely bytenuous
conjectures of gains "if we all keep cooperating" and penalties "if I
defect." The stability ofthe coordination seems greatest when imposed
and weakest when implicit. However, its "representativeness"-its
reflection ofthe collective objectives ofparticipants-may be greatest
when it is agreed or negotiated among equals.
Among otherthings, this implies a potential opportunity in the future
for atypical participants to initiate fruitful ideas for enhancing coor-
dination. The United States may todaybein a betterposition torespond
to cooperating, coordinating ideas from abroad (e.g., from Israel, Can-
ada, Japan, Mexico) than to initiate them itself. We turn in the next
section to prospects such as this in the midst ofchanging environments
for trade policy coordination.
3.3 -Changing Environments and Prospects for Coordination of
Trade Policy
The environmentfor trade policy coordinationtodayis quite different
than in the early post-World War II period when many enduring con-
ventions of coordination were established under the GATT.
In the policy environment for coordination, the most significant
changes have been the leveling out of influence among national gov-
ernments relative to U.S. dominance in the early postwar period and179 Trade Policy
the development of new administrative instruments of trade policy to
replace the limitations that the GATT successfully coordinated for tar-
iffs. In the economic environmentfor coordination, the most significant
change has been the growth of large, mobile corporations that them-
selves practice coordination across borders. They are multinational in
both operations and ownership. In the intellectual environment, these
changes have been captured in the development ofan analysis oftrade
policy coordination in strategic environments-those with small num-
bers of large rival firms and/or governments-that has challenged in-
sights from the venerable competitive consensus.
These environmental changes interact with each other. Multinational
corporations make it harder for any government to define and pursue
its "own" national interest. Returns to the "capital endowment" that
a country's residents own depend on revenue from far-flung foreign
affiliates as well as revenue from home. Discriminatory border policies
that increase revenue from one source at the expense ofanother have
ambiguous effects on "our" multinational firms and their owners. Firms
that are largely "ours" (majority-owned) may nevertheless pay sig-
nificant fractions of their revenues to foreign shareholders. Strategic
influence over the location and competitiveness of large, mobile mul-
tinationals is an understandably important objective of modern trade
policy and leads to concerns about market access and administrative
instruments such as performance requirements, tax incentives, and
unitary tax systems. The sensitivity offirms to thesepolicies aggravates
the adjustment problems faced by owners ofimmobile factors of pro-
duction-narrowly skilled workers, farmers, civil servants. Such groups
are not internationally coordinated but may be large and coordinated
internally (e.g., labor unions). Trade policies that protect and insure
them, or that help them adjust to shifting sectoral prosperity, have a
very different orientation than trade policies that expand markets abroad
for exporting and multinational firms, insuring their right ofestablish-
ment and fair competition. A country's own internal policy coordina-
tion can be undermined by a schizophrenia in which departments of
commerce and ministries of industry promote "competitiveness"-
enhancing trade policies while departments of agriculture and minis-
tries oflabor promote protectionist trade policies. International policy
coordination is all the more difficult when large internal trade policy
constituencies are uncoordinated or hostile. 19
The following subsections describe these environmental changes in
more detail and trace their implications for trade policy coordination.
3.3.1 Shifts in the Policy Environment
Policy environments have evolved (devolved?) since the 1950s and
early 1960s. Strategic interaction among governments has come to reflect180 J.D. Richardson/R.S. Strauss/Me Kunihiro/E.T. Pratt, Jr.
shifts in relative economic size and influence. New instruments, insti-
tutions, and principles of strategic policy interaction have emerged.
Relative National Strengths
Formany reasons, dominant trade policy leadershipfell to the United
States early after World War 11. 20 Its economy was least devastated by
the war. Its military forces spearheaded resistance to Soviet expansion
and played important roles in European and Japanese economic re-
construction. It vetoed the multilaterally planned ITO (Diebold 1952)
in favor of a compact of its narrow commercial provisions, which be-
came the GATT, more U.S.-patterned than the ITO would have been.
In strategic terms, this was a period ofhegemonic interaction. Gov-
ernmentsofrelatively weakcountries did notbehave strategically. They
tended to take U.S. trade policies as given and to adopt whatever trade
policies seemed best for themselves without perceiving much scope
for influencing the United States thereby. U.S. incentives were to act
strategically, but in a unique way. The United States tended to choose
trade initiatives mindful of collective foreign response, such as in its
encouragement of European economic integration. But it could afford
tobeimpassively obliging towardrecalcitranceorprovocationby single
trading partners because the impacts were relatively small. This unu-
sual combinationofmultilateral strategizingandbilateralimpassiveness
is similar to what one might expect from a large firm in an industry
with a fringe of small perfect competitors. The large firm will be stra-
tegically calculating toward the aggregated collection of competitors
but will appear unflappable toward isolated deviance.
Two things change if small agents in hegemonic environments grow
significantly relative to the hegemon. They begin to act strategically
towardthe hegemon, seekingtopressadvantage and avoid its perceived
"exploitation"; the hegemon no longer finds their provocations too
minor to warrant response.
All this seems to have characterized the trade policy environment
ofthe past forty years. First Europe and then Japan (and even several
other countries) have grown relative to the United States in key indi-
cators of economic influence. Patterns for two such indicators are il-
lustrated in tables 3.4 and 3.5.21 Such newly influential governments
have begun to shape their trade policy strategically, attentive to U.S.
response (e.g., Tokyo Round tariff-cutting initiatives by the EEC). And
the u.S. government has become much more mindful ofthe domestic
injury caused by "unfair" trade practices among its large trading part-
ners and consequently has become much more active in legislating
trade policy remedies. Figure 3.1 reveals the rise in unfair trade activity
(bottom panel) relative to escape clause activity (top panel), which has
actually fallen. Table 3.6 shows the recent acceleration of U.S. trade





































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Fig. 3.1 Trends in U.S. import relief (Section 201) and unfair trade
remedies. Top panel: Escape clause investigations, 1975-85.
Bottom panel: Countervailing duty and antidumping inves-
tigations, 1979-85. Source: Destler (1986, 124, based on ap-
pendix B).
Table 3.6 Number of Trade Bills Introduced in Various U.S. Congresses



















Sources: Destler (1986,75-76), Ahearn (1986).
aCounts bills whose primary purpose was to restrict trade or benefit U.S. producers.
bCounts bills employing twenty trade-related terms, some to expand trade, some to
protect, with various shades based on personal evaluation.
cGrowth rate betweenJanuary-Septemberof1985 andJanuary-Septemberof1983 applied
to number of bills introduced to 98th Congress: (49/30) x 57.
d1985 figure times 2.184 J.D. Richardson/R.S. Strauss/Me Kunihiro/E.T. Pratt, Jr.
Instead ofbeing analogous to an industry with one large firm facing
a fringe of small competitors, the trade policy environment today is
closer to a genuine oligopoly with a small number oflarge "coequals."
This has many implications:
1. It suggests that trade policy coordination cannot feasibly be im-
posedbutmustbe eitherexplicitlynegotiated (''agreed" in thelanguage
of section 3.2.2) or implicitly adhered to. The United States can no
longer dictate the timing, agenda, or formulae for multilateral trade
liberalization, as illustrated by comparing the outcomes ofGATT min-
isterial meetings in November 1982 and September 1986 to those prior
to the Kennedy Round in 1963 (Baldwin 1986a, 5-12).
2. It suggests that any ofthe coequal governments can initiate trade
policy coordination, not just the historic "leader.''22 In fact, if the
historic leader is nursing a sense of injustice and grievance over lost
("stolen") influence, with sporadic withdrawal and "lashing out" as
in interpersonal conflict, then it might enhance the chance of success
for coordinating initiative to be reversed. The United States may, today
in particular, be better able to respond cooperatively to cooperative
initiatives abroad than to defend taking cooperative initiative itself.23
The posture implied for governments in Europe and Japan is more
aggressively inviting than usual; that implied for the U.S. government
is more "seductively responsive" than usua1. 24
3. It suggests that iftrade policy leadership is not adequately forth-
comingfrom newly coequalgovernments, there may bereasonto invest
"independent agents" with specified leadership functions. Such func-
tions might include monitoring, reporting, and initiating meetings (and
perhaps even complaints). Suggestions range from radical to mild. Some
favor restructuring the GATT institutionally to resemble the IMF (Camps
and Diebold 1983, 59-67).25 Others suggest merely the creation of an
Independent Trade Policy Committee ("serviced by the GATT Sec-
retariat"; GATT Wisemen's Report 1985,42) or a permanent negoti-
ating committee (Aho and Aronson 1985, 48). The aim of all such
suggestions is to facilitate leadership impetus and provision ofaccurate
information, both crucial to maintaining policy coordination and avoid-
ing devolution into disarray and possibly trade war.
4. It suggests the advent ofdiscriminatory trade policy coalitions. A
coalition is coordination of limited scope among a subset of trading
partners over (perhaps) a subset of issues. It is a natural occurrence
in strategic interaction among coequals and is by its nature discrimi-
natory (not MFN). A hegemonic environment by its nature provides
no motive for coalitions eitherfor the large agent orfor the many small
ones. These insights seem little appreciated in recent discussions. To-
day's trade policy environment is structurally conducive to coalitions
and hostile to MFN, whereas the postwarhegemonic environment was185 Trade Policy
the opposite. The difficult question is whether conservation efforts
aimed at preserving the life of this endangered animal (MFN) are still
worthwhile, or whether inevitable extinction should be hastened in an
effort to breed species more at home in today's jungle!
5. It suggests that if implicit trade policy coordination is followed,
(see section 3.2.2) then periods of cooperation may be punctuated by
periodsof''punishment" for perceivedpolicy violation with, ofcourse,
counterretaliation and symptoms of trade war.26 Difficult technical
questions involve how the probability and duration of such periods
vary with asymmetries in the size of the agents involved or with the
size of the parties or coalitions being "punished,"27 and what sort of
dispute-settlement mechanisms most predictably restore the peace of
implicit coordination.
New Instruments, Institutions, and Principles
Administered intervention. Every coordination compact is at risk
because ofthe constant temptation for each rival to try surreptitiously
to avoid the constraints on behavior, that is, to "cheat" secretly on
one's partner-rivals.
This instability can be seen in the growth of "administered inter-
vention" aimed surreptitiously at undoing the effects of GATT-
coordinated reductions in tariff bindings. Administered intervention is
flexible, discretionary decision-making toward opaque nontax instru-
ments ofimportprotection andexportpromotion. Itincludes voluntary
export restraints, orderly marketing agreements, standards, licensing,
and internal distribution barriers to imports, as well as performance
requirements, taxforgiveness, creditguarantees, and implicit subsidies
of many types for exports.
Whalley (1985) provides a striking way to illustrate the significance
ofadministered intervention. In estimating the welfare effects ofcom-
plete removal ofboth tariffs and nontariffbarriers to imports, he finds
the latter to account for more than half of the estimated effects. His
calculations are summarized in table 3.7.28 According to them, admin-
istered intervention affects the exports and imports ofJapan the most
and the United States the least.
One implication of the greater use of administered intervention is
intricacy. It becomes harder to identify foreign policies, much less
measure their effects. It also becomes harder to implement one's own
trade objectives. Intricacy raises the resource cost of estimating and
monitoring, and slows down trade policymaking. In the United States,
administrative intervention in trade, unlike tariffs, invades the turfs of
regulatory agencies, congressional oversight committees, and some-
times even the judiciary.186 J.D. Richardson/R.S. Strauss/Me Kunihiro/E.T. Pratt, Jr.
Table 3.7 Nontariff Barrier Share of Own-Country Welfare Effect from







42 to 57 percent
52 to 62 percent




40 to 47 percent
56 to 62 percent
53 to 69 percent
Source: Whalley (1985, 181-82).
aLow number in each cell assigns none of the interaction effect from removing both
tariffs and nontariff barriers together to nontariff barriers; high number assigns all the
interaction effect to nontariff barriers.
Intricacy increases allegations of unfairness and discrimination be-
cause administered intervention is inherently opaque. Opaqueness
heightens suspicions that something discriminatory and unfair is going
on below surface appearances. Information about administered inter-
vention can become so costly for noninsiders to obtain that extraor-
dinary mechanisms are needful to obtainit, such as "protectionbalance
sheets" and "surveillance reports" (GATT Wisemen's Report 1985,
35, 42). The value of information for maintaining coordinated coop-
eration is higher in environments with administered intervention than
in those with more transparent trade policy instruments like tariffs,
quotas, and export subsidies. Economists who applaud the benefits of
price competition but are chary of nonprice competition (advertising
and so on) might consider the trade policy analog. There may be much
clearer benefits to "tariff competition" -negotiating coordinated
concessions in the traditional way, threatening tax-based retaliation,
and so on-than to competition and coordination among governments
in administered intervention. All the features that make prices effective
andefficient signals in private resource allocation make tariffs andother
trade taxes effective and efficient signals in policy coordination. Among
other things, this supports the recommendation sometimes heard for
"re-tariffication" (e.g., Hufbauer and Rosen 1986).
Another implication of administered intervention is heightened
"preemptive consciousness." Anticipations of a brave new world of
coordinated (voluntary) export restraints, with market shares allotted
according to the historical status quo, creates a race among large firms,
and maybe entire industries, to "stake out claims" by penetrating and
expanding quickly. Administered intervention may thus bring import
surges upon itself. They are the rational response to expectations that
a government will soon decide to vest the import "rights" ofexisting
large suppliers in a set of "fair shares." Steel firms and automakers187 Trade Policy
abroad observe that it happened in apparel and anticipate it for them-
selves; machine toolmakers abroad observe that it happened in steel
and autos and anticipate it for themselves; and so on.29 Tariffs and
other transparent policy instruments have not historically created the
same preemptive surges because both levels and changes were trans-
parently bound into the GATT.
"Minilateralism." Allegations ofunfair and injurious behavioron the
part of large trading partners who have "caught up" with the United
States have made it more vigilant about unfair trade from any source.
Even small trading partners come under scrutiny. All developed coun-
tries view the catch-up growth of newly industrializing countries (vis-
ible most clearly for Brazil, Mexico, and Korea in table 3.4) with alarm
and similar suspicions. (Indeed there are legitimate grounds for such
suspicions as the economic environment includes more and more in-
ternationally coordinated multinational firms, as discussed in section
3.3.2). Although negotiation with dynamic small competitors may not
seem worthwhile, exclusion of them from multilateral trade policy in-
itiatives is easy and quite tempting. Isolation of"offenders" is a seem-
ingly cheaper alternative to coordinated dispute settlement.
Thus the apparent growth ofunfair trade becomes one ofthe forces
behind "minilateralism," the tendency to circle the wagons, to reduce
the number ofparticipants involved in trade policy coordination.30This
has virtue (section 3.2.2) to the extent that international catch-up pres-
sures really do depend importantlyonunfairpractices. Butto the extent
that these are just fair and normal competitive pressures for new en-
trants, coordinated "minilateralism" is synonymous with barriers to
entry and cartelization, and has little economic merit.
A closely related force behind minilateralism is the disparity ofmar-
ket dependence among GATT countries. Degrees of regulation vary,
as does reliance onprivate ratherthan state-ownedand state-supported
firms (see below). Multilateral negotiations of a traditional kind have
become increasingly cumbersome because of differences of objective
and structural understanding.
These differences lead naturally to initiatives that narrow the geo-
graphical and sectoral scope ofnegotiations in order to make any prog-
ress at all. The 1986 report ofthe United States Trade Representative
(USTR 1986, 61-62) is remarkably blunt:
Nevertheless, multilateral negotiations are not an end in them-
selves....
America has decided to pursue trade liberalization opportunities
wherever and whenever they exist, whether in a multilateral, pluri-
lateral or bilateral context.
Although the United States would prefer pursuing trade liberali-
zation through multilateral negotiations, it is deeply concerned that188 J.D. Richardson/R.S. Strauss/Me Kunihiro/E.T. Pratt, Jr.
the process may now be too cumbersome to achieve meaningful and
timely results. Indeed, the increasing number of GATT Contracting
Parties and growing divergence of their viewpoints guarantee ever
more awkward and prolonged negotiations....
If the United States cannot reach timely trade agreements on a
multilateral basis, it is prepared to progress on trade issues by ne-
gotiating on a bilateral or plurilateral basis with like-minded
nations....
It is time to recognize that across-the-board discussions among all
GATT members may not be the best way to promote GATT goals.
There is a greaterneedfor a variety ofarrangements underthe GATT
umbrella so trade liberalization can progress on at least some fronts
without waiting for all issues to be settled to all parties' satisfaction.
When a group of countries can negotiate a trade liberalizing agree-
ment, provision should be made for its acceptance under the GATT.
Consistent with this intent, the United States has in the past few years
negotiated: a quite inclusive free trade agreement with Israel and sec-
toral liberalization with Japan (Market-Oriented Sector Specific initi-
atives) and Caribbean trading partners. Negotiations continue with
Canada toward sectoral free trade. The EEC, of course, continues to
expand the boundaries ofits own preferential liberalization. And forty-
eight of the largest developing countries agreed in May 1986 to begin
trade negotiations among themselves under a Global System ofTrade
Preferences.
A worrisome implication of these minilateral trends is, of course,
that the world may become fragmented into hostile trading blocs, Uru-
guay Round notwithstanding. There is a more promising perspective,
however. It is that in today's policy environment only minilaterallib-
eralizing coordination is feasible. More than that, it is an ideal crucible
in which to experiment with new coordination techniques: new defi-
nitions, rules, monitoring arrangements, and dispute settlement pro-
cedures. Minilateral coordination within the EEC, for example, is al-
most surely going to involve important progress on coordinating trade
policy in services, such as in telecommunications. Minilateral coor-
dination between Canada and the United States is almost surely going
to make progress on unfair trade rules and procedures. In the longer
run, multilateral negotiations over new GATT codes and among "blocs"
(a pejorative term in this context) may be usefully informed by the
precedents and experiments of minilateralism.
It is undeniable that these minilateral and bilateral movements are
retreats from multilateral coordination of the historic kind, resting on
the MFN principle (unconditional in principle, but in the practice of
nearly every country, quite conditioned). Strategic "retreats" may,
however, allow trade policy coordination to regroup beneficially just189 Trade Policy
as they do an army. They may furthermore be wise ifincreasing parity
among countries in economic influence undermines MFN and enhances
the idea ofoptimal coalition-building (see point 4 of"Relative National
Strengths" in this section). In this light, it might be better not to call
this a retreat from multilateralism based on MFN but, for example, to
call it a "new" multilateralism based on a "More-Favored-Nation prin-
ciple" pI The GATT codes of the Tokyo Round can in fact be seen as
an innovative vehicle for the new multilateralism.
GATTcodes. GATT codes are an innovative.device for adopting the
best aspects of coordinated minilateralism, controlling the worst as-
pects of administered intervention, and maintaining the many GATT
mechanisms that continue to be relevant to liberalizing coordination.
Five important codes were negotiated during the Tokyo Round of
GATT negotiations: on subsidies, procurement, standards, import li-
censing, and customs valuation. Each was negotiated by a subset of
GATT members, each on a trade policy issue of narrow scope. Each
forms a supplement to the GATT, with five independent lists of sig-
natories that do not include all GATT members. By restricting partic-
ipation and focusing on narrow issues, the codes reduced the potential
for hostile undermining ofcoordination. Their provisions are, however,
applied in principle on an MFN basis (except by the United States
whose application of the first three codes was conditional).32 Each is
administered by a Committee of Signatories serviced by the GATT
Secretariat, and each has its own dispute settlement mechanism.
In general, the Tokyo Round codes aimed at rules and procedures
for harmonization and transparency rather than at significant liberali-
zation. This is one reason for not according undue weight to assess-
ments of their "only modest" success, or to the general agreement
among commentators that the subsidies code in particular has not worked
well. They might be judged more optimistically as successful "stand-
still" agreements, strategic defenses against decoordination rather than
catalysts of coordination.33 They might also be judged successful for
creating strategically ambiguous34 GATT-consistent minilateralism. And
they are commendable attempts to cope with administered intervention
in a realistic way.
The Tokyo Round attempt to negotiate a safeguards code failed,
however, and the subsidies code has room for considerable improve-
ment, comments above notwithstanding. Acceptable codes on subsi-
dies and safeguards are, in fact, especially needful becauseofimportant
changes in the economic environment.
3.3.2 Shifts in the Economic Environment
Moderntrade policy issues arisein economicenvironments that seem
increasingly strategic anddo notfit the orthodox competitiveparadigm.190 J.D. Richardson/R.S. Strauss/Me Kunihiro/E.T. Pratt, Jr.
Mobile Multinational Firms
One essential aspect of a firm is coordination within itself; as firms
have grown multinationally over the past few decades, corporate in-
ternational coordination has grown apace. There are many reasons for
this growth. The EEC, communications innovation, capital-market in-
tegration, and ambitious development plans all have encouraged co-
production,joint ventures, mergers, and global identity. In some global
markets, the same few firms compete everywhere. In some national
markets, a small number of firms vie for a "prize" that is essentially
control of the whole national industry. The growth of trade has been
more rapid in manufactures-withpotentialfor firm-focused economies
of scale, technological gaps, product differentiation, and taste for va-
riety-than in agricultural and mineral products, as shown in figure
3.2. Within manufactures, the growth of trade has been more rapid in
industries with a concentrated, oligopolistic market structure than in
those with a competitive structure; trade in aircraft, electronic ma-
chinery, chemicals, and petrochemicals grew much faster between 1973
and 1983 than trade in wood, paper, and foods, as shown in table 3.8.
Table 3.9 shows further that U.S. multinational firms maintained their
shares of world exports over the past thirty years, even as the U.S.
geographical share declined, and have grown in their shares of U.S.
trade.
In concentrated strategic environments, firms clearly recognize the
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Changing commodity composition of world exports, 1950-
85 (broad categories; volume indices, 1950 = 100). Source:
GATT (1986a, 12).Table 3.8 Changing Commodity Composition of World Imports, 1973-1983 (narrow
categories)
Percentage Percentage shares in
shares in value value of world trade
Rank of world trade excluding fuels
1983 1973 Product categories 1983 1973 1983 1973
1 1 Crude petroleum 12.4 7.6
2 7 Petroleum products 4.9 2.4
3 4 Passenger motor cars 3.8 3.8 4.7 4.2
4 2 Iron and steel 2.8 4.6 3.5 5.1
5 3 Textile yarn, fabrics, 2.6 4.1 3.2 4.6
made-up articles
6 9 Clothing 2.2 2.2 2.8 2.5
7 20 Office machines, data 2.2 1.4 2.8 1.5
processing equipment,
parts
8 8 Parts and accessories 2.0 2.2 2.5 2.5
of motor vehicles
9 45 Gas, natural and 2.0 0.3
manufactured
10 15 Artificial resins, plastic 2.0 1.9 2.4 2.1
materials, articles of
plastic
11 18 Organic chemicals 1.9 1.6 2.4 1.8
12 6 Wood manufactures, 1.9 2.4 2.3 2.7
paper
13 5 Cereals and 1.8 2.7 2.2 3.0
preparations
14 10 Fruits and vegetables 1.5 2.2 1.9 2.4
15 11 Oilseeds, vegetable 1.5 2.2 1.8 2.4
oils, oil cakes
16 24 Aircraft 1.2 0.9 1.5 1.0
17 17 Telecommunication 1.2 1.6 1.5 1.7
equipment, parts,
accessories
18 37 Transistors, etc. 1.2 0.7 1.5 0.8
(electronic
components)
19 27 Coffee, tea, cocoa, 1.1 0.9 1.4 1.0
spices
20 26 Lorries, special 1.1 0.9 1.4 1.0
vehicles
Total of above 51.3 46.6
World trade (market 100.0 100.0
economies)
Source: GATT (1985, 17).192 J.D. Richardson/R.S. Strauss/Me Kunihiro/E.T. Pratt, Jr.









Year U.S. firmsa Exportsb Importsb
1957 22.7c n.a. n.a. n.a.
1966 17.5 17.7 17.6 11.0
1977 13.3 17.6 26.7 21.7
1982 14.3 17.7 n.a. n.a.
1983 13.9 17.7 n.a. n.a.
Sources: Lipsey and Karvis (1986, 29) for columns 1 and 2; Little (1986,44) for columns
3 and 4.
aIncluding majority-owned foreign affiliates.
bTrade between U.S. multinational firms and theirforeign affiliates, majority-owned only,
it would seem.
c1957A figure x (1966B figure/1966A figure), where A and B are different classification
systems.
of governments. Governments recognize this, too. They have turned
to firm-focused performance requirements for which firm-focused fa-
vors, such as tax incentives, are returned. Each firm or government
conjectures how rivals and other agents will react to its own decisions.
Governments, furthermore, are sometimes the owners and indirect
managers of firms and may strategically "game" among themselves.
Large multinational firms might seem at first impression to be a force
against discriminatory border policy and encouraging to coordinated
liberalization of world trade-as influential constituents of many dif-
ferent governments simultaneously, whose flexibility and mobility would
be enhanced most by free trade. This can be true but need not be in
strategic environments. The Ford Motor Company supports protec-
tionist initiatives in the United States, and Airbus Industries has de-
pended on its sponsoring governments for support; Toyota and Nissan
have not clearly suffered from auto voluntary export restraints, es-
pecially not in their competition with smaller Japanese automakers.
Large firms will sometimes have the potential for influencing (exploit-
ing?) groups without strategic size or power. Krishna (1983), for ex-
ample, has shown how oligopolistic domestic and foreign firms may
welcome voluntary exportorimportquotas. Thesequotas canfacilitate
implicit collusion among them, reducing competitive cheating by sta-
bilizing market shares, at the expense of customers. Or, for another
example, oligopolistic national firms wanting to avoid potential entry
from abroad may be able to convince governments correctly that na-193 Trade Policy
tional economic welfare would indeed be higher with import barriers
that protect their market power (Dixit and Kyle 1985). Oligopolistic
national firms wishing to initiate entry into some unpenetrated market
may be similarly correct to make a national-welfare case for export
subsidies.35
Mobility ofmultinational firms and their professional workforce also
internationalizes ostensibly domestic policies,36 accentuating their
spillovers abroad and provoking foreign pressure for international pol-
icy coordination. There is, of course, always some tendency for a
country's sectoral policies to spill overabroad in mirror-image fashion.
But the size of these spillovers is much larger when corporate capital
resources are mobile. Most countries' industrial policies, for example,
entail corporate taxes and subsidies that encourage some domestic
sectors atthe expense ofotherdomestic sectors, butalso attheexpense
of the same favored sectors abroad. Alert multinationals may decide
that their expansioncanbe shifted to whicheveroftheiraffiliates enjoys
the most favorable sectoral policy incentives. Domestic subsidies and
taxes canthus easily become instruments ofstrategic sectoral predation
among countries.
It is no surprise, as multinational corporations have increased in size
and strategic influence, that domestic subsidies, performance require-
ments, and unfair trade have become hard bones of contention in the
policy environment.37 The recent claim that strategically calculating
policy can shape ("create," "destroy") a country's comparative ad-
vantage is correct, afterall, where that same policy is capableofmoving
capital endowments from one place to another, using the mediating
facilities of internationally coordinated firms, leaving labor and im-
mobile endowments behind. One country's strategically active sectoral
policy in that world can also deter another's from its beggar-thy-neighbor
attempts to shift comparative advantage and desirable employment.
Passive (more exactly impassive) policy does not have this capability
for defensive deterrence. Policy coordination in such a world is an
attempt to establish a peaceful equilibrium that may nonetheless be
backed up by arsenals of strategic policy weapons!
It is for these reasons easy to endorse the idea that there is unique
importance to the Uruguay Round negotiations on subsidies, including
revision of the existing subsidies code.38 At the very least, such ne-
gotiations will likely generate sharper definitions of spillovers and
agreement on procedural rules (Hufbauer and Shelton-Erb 1984). And
it may be timely for substantive rules and full-fledged attempts to ex-
change request-and-offer lists for reciprocal reductions of specified
subsidies that would then be "bound" like tariffs.39
The more fundamental question this prospect raises is whetherpolicy
should bejustas coordinatedamonggovernments as corporateplanning
is among national affiliates. Skeptics about the merits of markets,194 J.D. Richardson/R.S. Strauss/Me Kunihiro/E.T. Pratt, Jr.
especially internationally integrated markets, tend to respond "yes."
Skeptics about the merits ofindustrial regulation, especially when cen-
tralized on a global (coordinated) scale, tend to respond "no."40
Adjustment
Adjustment problems in the economic environment have become
arguably more severe in the past fifteen years. Average unemployment
rates and excess capacity are higher. Burgeoning, globally integrated,
financial markets have created volatile changes in exchange rates, in-
ternational competitiveness, and goods trade. These changes and the
strategic sensitivity of multinational firms to governments and each
other have aggravated the stimuli facing workers, farmers, and other
owners of immobile resources. Their adjustment problems are made
even worse by the potential for substitutability between goods trade
and mobile corporate capital. When goods and firms are both inter-
nationally mobile, then only slight changes in the economic or policy
environment can bring about striking changes in exports, imports, and
the livelihood ofimmobile factors that are tied closely to them(Mundell
1957). To a large multinational firm, moving the goods and moving the
plant across borders are close substitutes; they are not to its immobile
workers and their unions. Displaced workers and mid-level managers
who are unable to acquire or transfer skills useful to alternative sectors
face long periods of unemployment and below-average earnings.
Table 3.10 hints at the size ofthe adjustment problem that might face
immobile workers from trade liberalization in today's economic envi-
ronment. Sector-by-sector employment changes are quite large, even
though their aggregate (sum) may be small. They are much larger than
similar estimates prepared for the Tokyo Round negotiations in the late
1970s by Baldwin, Mutti, and Richardson (1980,419).
Inbrief, immobile workers seemto be saddledwith sharperand more
frequent unanticipated shocksfrom internationalforces thanin the past
(Grossman and Richardson 1985, 20-23). Some of the agents who
represent them are strategically large within countries, although un-
coordinated across them, such as unions, regional governments, and
Departments (Ministries) ofAgriculture. Strategic interaction between
them and their own government can lead to indefinite protection-a
kind of strategic paralysis of unproductivity.
In this environment the challenge to all policy, national and inter-
nationally coordinated, is formidable. Adjustment burdens can be re-
duced ifnational policy minimizes the economic hardship to immobile
segments ofthe population, and sensible policy may include temporary
and degressive protection (Diamond 1982). But commitment to even-
tual adjustment seems a necessity, since rational strategic agents will
forecast future government action when contemplating a specialized
investment. Government commitmentto "preservation" makes no pri-195 Trade Policy
Table 3.10 Percentage Change in Japanese and U.S. Employment by Sector
under Trade Liberalization
% of Change in % of Change in
Total Japanese Total U.S.
Employment with Employment with
Removal of U.S. Removal of
and Japanese Japanese Tariffs
Tariffs and and NTB's by
ISIC # Sector NTB's by Sector Sector
1 Agric, Forestry & Fisheries -50.2% +96.6%
310 Food, Beverages & +9.4 -4.9
Tobacco
321 Textiles + 18.8 -24.1
322 Wearing Apparel -1.3 -0.6
323 Leather Products +0.3 -1.7
324 Footwear +0.1 -0.1
331 Wood Product -0.7 -1.3
332 Furniture and Fixtures +0.2 -0.1
341 Paper and Paper Products +2.9 -2.0
342 Printing and Publishing +0.4 -0.7
35A Chemicals +4.7 -3.7
35B Petroleum and ReI. Prod. -9.5 +0.2
355 Rubber Products + 1.7 -2.2
36A Nonmetal Min. Products +2.3 -1.0
362 Glass and Glass Products +0.4 -0.5
371 Iron and Steel +26.0 -7.8
372 Nonferrous Metals + 1.3 -1.4
381 Metal Products + 1.9 -2.5
382 Nonelectric Machinery +5.0 -2.8
383 Electric Machinery +3.4 -2.8
384 Transport Equipment +4.2 + 1.0
38A Miscellaneous Manuf. + 13.3 -14.9
2 Mining and Quarrying +4.3 -2.8
4 Electric, Gas & Water +2.7 -1.2
5 Construction -3.2 0.0
6 Wholesale and Retail Trade -9.3 -12.6
7 Transportation, Storage + 1.1 -3.3
and Communication
8 Finance, Ins. & Real Est. -2.6 -3.4
9 Commercial, Social and -18.7 -2.2
Personal Services
Source: Saxonhouse (1986, 242), combining estimates in Deardorffand Stern (1986) and
Staiger, Deardorff and Stern (1986).
vate adjustment the strategic and equilibrium response. Government
commitment to unspecified "eventual" adjustment makes waiting the
strategic and equilibrium response. Only credible commitment to ad-
justment makes it possible for anticipations ofgovernment reaction to
alter ex ante location and allocation decisions.196 J.D. Richardson/R.S. Strauss/Me Kunihiro/E.T. Pratt, Jr.
Yet it is hard for a national government on its own to guarantee
credibly that protection is only temporary or degressive. If the con-
ditions thatjustified the protection continue to exist, the incentives are
nearly irresistable for the government to repeat its "temporary" dose
at similar intensity, and to repeat it again and again. Ifstrategic agents
sense how irresistible this pattern is, they will refuse to believe in the
proclaimed temporariness ofthe trade policy and will remain active in
the protected sector rather than exiting. Their continued activity keeps
conditions the same as those that warranted the trade policy in the first
place and seduces the government to repeat its temporary protection.
The sequence then repeats. It should be clear that this cycle represents
a strategic equilibrium, a position of rest in which temporary or de-
gressive trade policy is impossible (that is, not sustained by the pos-
tulated strategic behavior).41
Strategic policy coordination among governments can help alleviate
this problem. Under GATT rules, trading-partner governments can
already request consultationandcompensationwhen a temporarytrade
policy becomes permanent. If the consultation/compensation mecha-
nism were working well, then the first government's pledge of tran-
sience would become more credible. Private agents would be more
likely to exit. Such consultation and compensation have been largely
abandoned, however, as have othersafeguard procedures underArticle
XIX of the GATT. This heightens the urgency of safeguard revisions
in the Uruguay Round negotiations and explains the possible appeal
ofastanding "adjustmentcommittee" (GATT Wisemen's Report 1985,
43-44) that would monitor temporary, degressive protection and fa-
cilitate international pressure on a government to keep its degressivity
credible to domestic constituents. A standing committee with this charge
illustrates how an "independent agent" can sometimes help strategic
rivals to achieve coordination by making their promises credible, as
discussed in section 3.3.1 above.42
There are reasons, ofcourse, why trade policy may not be the ideal
insulatorofaneconomyfrom unforeseen shocks, northe mostdesirable
catalyst for adjustment. A less wasteful alternative for achieving the
same goal might be a loan and insurance scheme for workerexperience
and investment in human capital (Grossman and Richardson 1985,26),
providing benefits (contingent on payment ofpremiums) dependent on
the state ofcompetition from abroad. Under such a program, countries
would continue to enjoy the benefits of low-priced imports, and in-
centives for factor reallocation might be preserved.
Strategic policy coordination could have a role to play here as well,
in that some ofthe beneficiaries from "our" smoother adjustment are
"their" firms, workers, and unions who take over the market. These
agents might therefore fairly be expected to contribute to the insurance197 Trade Policy
premiums thathelp fund ouradjustment. More exactly, since successful
adjustment creates favorable foreign spillovers, coordinated interna-
tional loan and insurance schemes may some day be worth consider-
ation, perhaps financed most easily by a small tax on all international
transactions (capital movements as well as trade), or possibly by a
more targeted but larger tax on trade surpluses, administered by a
GATT standingadjustmentcommittee as described above. Coordinated
international loan and insurance programs might also be more resistant
than national schemes to moral hazard problems and to "capture" by
political forces (e.g., the U.S. government's use of trade adjustment
assistance to assuage autoworkers in the late 1970s).
Notes
This paper has benefited immeasurably from the detailed comments ofRobert E.
Baldwin and Geoffrey Carliner on an earlier draft. It was written as part of
the NBER's research program in international studies, but the opinions ex-
pressed are my own.
1. So, too, might students ofother kinds ofinternational policy coordination;
see Cooper (1986) for an instructive linking ofpublic health to macroeconomic
coordination.
2. See Cooper (1987,299-301) or Baldwin (1984b, 5-9) for an account along
these lines ofthe growth ofthe U.S. Trade Agreements Program. It is easy to
forget that the genesis ofthose agreements was the burden oftrade repression
during the hostile trade wars of the early 1930s. For the United States, which
legislated the infamous Smoot-Hawley tariffs in 1930, the constant-dollar value
of trade (exports plus imports) fell 35 percent between 1929 and 1934, almost
half again further than real GNP, which fell 24 percent (U.S. Department of
Commerce 1976, 324). Overall world trade volume declined 25 percent (GATT
1986a, 31) during the same period.
3. Framers of trade policy are always quite mindful of other governments,
as are a few analyses as well, most notably Johnson (1954). Otherwise brief
mentions of retaliation, but little analysis, appears in traditional economic
commentary.
4. There are fundamental insights about policy coordination from analysis
of competitive environments, but such analysis nevertheless begs the central
question. Traditional competitive analysis can generate the ideas that open
international trade is a global public good, that some governments may be
tempted therefore to "free ride," and that a country's trade barriers create
impacts abroad of the same character as externalities (spillovers). Some sort
of mechanism would be desirable to alleviate the public good/free rider/exter-
nality problems and seems on the face of it to require international policy
coordination. The crucial question being begged, though, is what incentive
motivates anyone ofa large numberofcompetitive governments to create and
maintain coordination with others. What "internalizes the externalities"? Per-
fectly competitive assumptions rule out much of the motivational impetus for
policy coordination from the start. Ifsomeone protests that in reality a number198 J.D. Richardson/R.S. Strauss/Me Kunihiro/E.T. Pratt, Jr.
of governments are large, not atomistic, then such a protestor has implicitly
accepted the need for strategic analysis, perhaps without realizing it, and has
also pointed to the kind of strategic bargaining (pricing) that does internalize
the externalities in the fashion of Coase (1960).
5. See Brander's (1986,36-43) orRichardson's (1986,270-74) account, each
of which applies to trade policy the extensive research of political scientist
Robert Axelrod (1983) on repeated prisoner's dilemma games.
6. The word "surveillance" in GATT parlance entails each signatory's ob-
ligations to publish all trade measures, to consult, and if necessary, to partic-
ipate in dispute settlement procedures. In essence, each member thereby mon-
itors all the others; no central institution does so.
7. In the primitive model of table 3.1, each government agrees that the
objective is to maximize its own country's feasible gains without regard to
what the other country achieves. Since +3 is infeasible without luck, foolish-
ness, or coercion (a kind of coordination by force), each government prefers
+ 1 to - 1 and is attracted to proposals to create coordination devices.
8. The obvious characterization of this objective is "cutting off one's nose
to spiteone'sface." Itis an all-too-familiarposturefor agents in hostile conflict.
Trade embargoes are a good example.
9. Objectives might then seem to be common again, but they are not. "My"
goal is the distance between me and you; "yours" is the distance between you
and me.
10. See, for example, the Uruguay Round invocation of these principles in
GATT (1986b, 3). Camps and Diebold (1983, 55) remark that:
The approach we suggest is based on reason.... But governments are apt
to be driven by more immediate aims, by a sense of damage and a wish to
rectify matters.
11. The sheer number ofparticipants can matter, too, for reasons described
in note 4. Having too many potential participants makes the negotiating en-
vironment more competitive, less strategic, and reduces the motivational in-
centives for each government to contribute toward cooperative initiative. Thus
to limit the scope by limiting the numberofparticipants enhances coordination
in its own right; choosing like-minded participants enhances coordination fur-
ther. It is in this light that one can understand why each of the Tokyo Round
"codes" for nontariff measures was negotiated by an interested subgroup
within the GATT, and why each maintains its own list of signatories-with
implicit discrimination against nonsigners. See further discussion in section
3.3.1.
12. The issue ofcommon understanding ofpayoffs and behavior is discussed
further in Cooper (1986) and Holtham (1986).
13. Baldwin (1987) gives a useful account of both principles.
14. Camps and Diebold (1983, 29-30) illustrate this tension nicely:
The goal is ... to improve the conditions ofinternational agricultural trade.
. . . But there is also a need to protect the rest of the GATT system from
the impact offierce disputes about agriculture... [which] can hinder prog-
ress on other subjects.
So does the Uruguay Round declaration (GATT 1986b, 2), albeit with the
appearance of doublespeak:
Balanced concessions should be sought within broad trading areas and sub-
jects to be negotiated in order to avoid unwarranted cross-sectoral demands.
15. See Keohane (1984) for an extensive discussion.
16. One might think ofthis as the "bad-ideas-are-better-botched" principle.199 Trade Policy
17. See Oudiz and Sachs (1984) for an approach to this question for mac-
roeconomic policy coordination.
18. Parenting offers many illustrations. So does the discussion ofhow "con-
stitutions" comeaboutand whattheycontain, as appliedtotradepolicynotably
by the late Jan Tumlir (1985) and Banks and Tumlir (1986).
19. Proponents of free trade and skeptics about the virtue of coordination
of course argue that this schizophrenia is "good." See Price (1986) and Gold-
stein (1986) for descriptions ofthese different constituencies and their influence
on V.S. trade policy. Destler (1986) contains an excellent up-to-date evaluation
ofV.S. internal coordination of trade policy.
20. Baldwin (1986a) and Destler (1986,42-47) provide informative perspec-
tives on the material in this subsection.
21. Again environmental changes can be seen to interact with each other.
The convergence in per capita income among the countries in table 3.4 en-
courages especially the growth of intraindustry trade, based on product dif-
ferentiation, variety, and scale. These characteristics often engender imper-
fectly competitive market structures and significant reshufflings of narrow
product''niches" amongfirms as technological change and othershocks occur,
with consequent volatility for immobile factors (see section 3.3.2 below).
22. Baldwin and Richardson (1987, 143) list several reasons why trade policy
coordination among coequal governments might bejustas stable as hegemonic
coordination. They also mention, however, that it suggests different "styles"
or "tactics" oftrade policy for all the participants.
23. See the discussion of hostile environments in section 3.2.1.
24. See Richardson (1987a, 289; 1986, 97). See also Destler (1986, 48-49),
who remarks that
... [S]ince the new competitors were slow to assert leadership in multilat-
eral trade negotiations, there was a growing divergence between the loci of
trade-political activism and trade-economic power.
A similar reasoning underlies the observation that the V nited States still has
strong leadership to preserve present trade policy coordination by refraining
from hostile and/or uncoordinated initiatives, yet has lost leadership power to
advance coordination. See Baldwinand Richardson (1987, 123-24), for example.
25. The GATT has never technically "been" an "institution" at all-only a
"compact with signatories" -unlike the IMP with its executive directors,
standing committees, rules of order, and representation of membership.
26. Por descriptions ofimplicit coordination in the context ofoligopoly and
trade policy, see Friedman (1977), Jensen and Thursby (1983), Rotemberg and
Saloner (1986), and Lambson and Richardson (1987).
27. Onanindustrialcounterpartto theseissues, seeLambsonandRichardson
(1987). One among several conclusions they draw for the case ofprice-setting
supergames is that symmetry among firms stabilizes implicit collusion, making
"punishment" shorter and less likely, compared to slightly asymmetric con-
figurations offirms.
28. They seem to be a more meaningful way to measure the relative impor-
tance ofadministered intervention than alternatives, such as tabulations ofthe
share oftrade affected in some fashion by nontariff barriers. See Balassa and
Balassa (1984) and Nogues, Olechowski, and Winters (1986a, b).
29. Each is playing a rational strategy for an "end game," as illustrated, for
example, by Lawrence and Lawrence (1985). An end game is one in which a
future equilibrium is known, in this case cartelized industrial structure, and
agents choose optimal strategies for approaching it over time.200 J.D. Richardson/R.S. Strauss/Me Kunihiro/E.T. Pratt, Jr.
30. Curzon and Curzon (1985), for example, recommend thatthe (fair) traders
within the GATT form a coalition that aims at a free trade area that would
"eventually" cover "substantially all" trade, thereby attaining consistency
with Article XXIV, and isolate the non (unfair) traders.
31. "New" multilateralism is the term used by Camps and Diebold (1983).
"More-Favored-Nation" treatment is a term suggested by Thomas O. Bayard.
32. See Stern, Jackson, and Hoekman (1986, 6). This paper is a thorough
evaluation ofthe operationalfeatures ofthe codes, although not theireconomic
effects or legal standing.
33. Liberalizing coordination is, however, a logical future step, involving
probably "trade in concessions across Codes"-accession by one country to
one code in return for accession to another by another, forgoing insistence on
some provision in one code for a rival's concession in another code, and so
on.
34. Ambiguity can sometimes be a bargaining strength. See, for example,
Dixit (1987, 274).
35. See Brander's and Spencer's contributions to Krugman (1986) and other
work referenced there. These examples are from the new analytical thinking
on trade policy in strategic environments, also surveyed by Grossman and
Richardson (1985) and Richardson (1987b).
36. This is the twin ofthe observation that trade policy has become increas-
ingly "domesticated," drawn, for example, by Ahearn and Reifman (1984).
37. Camps and Diebold (1983, 22) illustrate this when they write that:
oneofthe basic principles that we think should guide the new multilateralism
. . . [is] that the international community has a legitimate concern with
domestic actions when they have important external effects.
38. Camps and Diebold (1983, 39) comment that:
Itis noexaggerationto saythatthe damage will ultimatelyleadtothe collapse
of the system of cooperation unless better ways are found to deal with the
conflicts among national industrial policies.
Policy coordination on subsidies and countervailing duties is also near the top
of Canada's list of reasons for pursuing bilateral trade liberalization with the
United States.
39. Baldwin (1986b, 28-34, among other places) outlines a detailed plan for
such negotiations in which modalities from historic rounds of tariff liberali-
zation are adapted to subsidies. One reason this makes sense is the inherent
(admittedly complex) measurability of subsidies as compared to more admin-
istrative intervention, hence their susceptibility to coordination by rules (see
section 3.2.2 above).
40. Many economists believe that policy competition among governments
exercises a healthy discipline on costly abuses oftheir regulatory powers. The
framers of the United States Constitution ambiguously reserved to Congress
the power "to regulate ... commerce among the several states" (Article I,
Section 8.3), implicitly excluding state governments from coordinating inter-
state trade policy, yet nevertheless reserving the authority to do so for a
centralized bpdy.
41. This policy problem is known technically as time inconsistency-this
year's optimal value for next year's policy intensity will no longer look optimal
when next year rolls around. The same problem canafflict all temporary policy.
See Staiger and Tabellini (1986) and Feenstra (1986) for further applications of
the idea to trade policy.201 Trade Policy
42. The same reasoning underlies the independence of a central bank from
political forces and accords the IMF, or a new intermediary, an independent
role in helping debtors' promises appear credible to creditors.
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2. Robert S. Strauss
Current Issues in u.s. Trade Policy
In response to the comment about the Europeans not being fully rep-
resented, after listening to Helmut Schmidt yesterday, I would say that
the Europeans were in fact a bit overrepresented. As was to be ex-
pected, Helmut was impressive enough and strong enough to last for
two days and thoroughly presented the European position.205 Trade Policy
This morning, when I was thinking about addressing this group on
the subject of trade and economic issues which each of you know so
much about, I was reminded ofan incident that happened to me several
years ago when I was testifying before the Senate on trade issues. In
the question-and-answer session, one senator was not only addressing
me but also perhaps lecturing me a bit on negotiations, in particular
on how to negotiate with the Japanese. Senator Hollings interrupted
and told this story, which is a bit crude but also relevant and amusing,
and you will forgive me if I relate it to you.
Senator Hollings noted that our colloquy reminded him of a story
about Jesse James, the old bank robber. As Jesse and his gang held up
a Texas bank, they got everyone out and put the men on one side of
the room and the women on the other, and Jesse said to them, "Now,
if you'll just behave, nobody's going to get killed. We're going to take
the valuables, the guns, and the money from the men, and then we're
going to ravish the women, and we're going to leave quietly. No one
will be killed." And with that, one ofthe men spoke up and said, "Now
wait a minute, Mr. James, you can have our money and our valuables,
and you can have our guns, but you can't put a hand on our women."
In response, a woman overon the other side spoke up and said, "Now,
Fred, don't go telling Jesse how to rob a bank." In speaking to this
group on trade and economics, I feel as ifI'm telling Jesse how to rob
a bank.
But let me get started.
I've been asked to cover a number ofthings, including an overview
of where we are and where we're going in the current round of trade
negotiations, and to talk a little bit about the Tokyo Round of trade
negotiations and relate that to the real political world and what's cur-
rently going on in the United States with respect to trade.
It occurred to me while I was making my notes for this talk that I
could open and close by saying that trade relations today are charac-
terized by a great deal less multilateralism, more bilateralism, some
minilateralism, and a great deal of ill-thought-through unilateralism.
That would just about summarize what I have to say on the issue of
trade. More seriously, however, let me begin by talking about trade
negotiation.
To be honest, when President Carter asked me to take the position
ofTrade Ambassador, I wasn't sure whether this was a good decision.
Did it make sense to ask a fellow who had absolutely no background
in international trade matters, but whose background was in law, pol-
itics, and negotiation, to be Trade Ambassador? At the time, I thought
it was a questionable decision and, frankly, I was concerned when I
accepted the responsibility because ofmy lack ofexpertise in the field
of trade. I might add, of course, that a great many others were also
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In retrospect, I believe it was a very good decision in terms of the
type ofperson he chose. And I'm not talking specifically about myself,
Bob Strauss, but rather about the type of person that the job really
requires. Because as I became involved in the Tokyo Round negotia-
tions, itbecame readily apparentthat someonewho had skills in moving
the political process was needed a great deal more than a specialist in
international trade issues and problems. And frankly, the skills that
were 'necessary in that particular negotiation, insofar as the political
process was concerned, just couldn't have been acquired or mastered
in time to get through a very troubled Congress. With the help of a
first-rate staff, I was able to deal with the substantive issues.
Protectionism in 1977- 78, you will recall, while not in the shape it
is today, was serious and the fires were raging. We were talking about
protectionism in terms that we had not talked about since the days of
Smoot-Hawley. The country's trade policy was under some attack, and
I can assure you that good trade policy can only exist where there is
a political consensus to support it. When I came on thejob, there was
no political consensus for the Tokyo Round or for a progressive, sen-
sible trade policy for the United States. Therefore, the first thing we
really went about doing was to fashion a consensus on the importance
and goals of U.S. trade policy.
My first months on the job were spent in doing two things: one,
trying to learn the trade issues; and two, going around the country,
personally and with members ofmy staff, to hundreds ofcongressional
districts and media centers, telling the story ofAmerica's self-interest.
That's what trade really boils down to in the United States. What really
drives the political process on trade and what we had to get across was
the self-interestthatpeople around the country-politicians, laborlead-
ers, businessmen, farmers-really had in the trade negotiations.
It took that same kind of approach to entice our trading partners
back to the table in a real negotiating posture. The Japanese, partic-
ularly Prime Minister Fukuda, were committed and supportive of the
Tokyo Round negotiations, but the Prime Minister wasn't prepared to
really get in front and lead the charge. The Europeans were reticent
and hesitant, with the French openly hostile to many of the positions
and goals we had outlined, as they are today. They were particularly
concerned with what might happen to the common agricultural policy
and other programs. But after much work, we were able to get every-
body to the negotiating table and begin the process.
The key in moving the negotiating process forward was the strong
leadership exercised by the various heads of state. I am deeply con-
cerned that one thing that was present throughout the Tokyo Round,
that is not present today as we begin the Uruguay Round, was a deep
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During the Tokyo Round, Fukuda, Schmidt, Callaghan, and Carter
were each committed to an aggressive trade negotiation. Moreover,
these leaders also understood the issues thoroughly and were able to
talk about these issues among themselves and were comfortable in
discussing them with their various constituencies.
Let me just give you an example based on my relationship with
President Carter. As far as President Carter was concerned, within an
hour after a phone call I could get into the Oval Office and tell him
that he needed to speak with Fukuda or with Schmidt, for example,
on an intractable problem that we just couldn't move the negotiators
on. His ability and willingness to pick up the phone, again within a
very short time period, and have a responsible, in-depth, substantive
conversation with the Prime Minister or Chancellor or whoever, was
a tremendous help and we never would have been successful witp.out
that. I would also add that Mike Blumenthal, who was deeply involved
in the Kennedy Round as Secretary of the Treasury, was committed
to the negotiations and was a strong force in the Carter Administration
as were Cy Vance and Richard Cooper at State.
Unfortunately, we don't have that type ofstrong network right now.
Clayton Yeutter doesn't have that kind ofsupport, and I see no reason
to expectthathis successor, whetherhe be a Democratora Republican,
will have that support. I am also not certain that the support that
Chancellor Kohl or Prime Minister Thatcher has given, or might give,
is in any way comparable to what their predecessors gave. And that is
unfortunate because, if nothing else, to complete a meaningful multi-
lateral negotiation with all the attendant problems, you must have strong
leadership and supportfor thatleadershipin eachofthe main countries.
You cannot successfully complete trade negotiations with ministers or
cabinet officers nibbling around the edges of the problem. In today's
climate, the world needs heads of government who understand the
issues in depth and who are willing to break them down and put their
muscle and their political power behind efforts to solve seemingly
intractable problems.
On a positive note with respect to the Uruguay Round, let me say
that I think a great many people sold Ambassador Yeutter short. His
predecessor, Bill Brock, commanded respect on the Hill, in the press,
and with our allies and trading partners. I think Brock could have had
a trade policy for this country had he had an Administration that fo-
cused on one. Yeutter came in with a good dealless going for him, and
the outlook was pessimistic. I can assure you, however, that he has
his hands on the controls. You can agree or disagree with certain
actions, but he has launched the Uruguay Round much better than
most observers ever dreamed he would be able to do. He deserves
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been cooperative and respect him. Within the government, he has had
good support from Secretary of Commerce Baldrige and Secretary of
Agriculture Lyng, but really little else to lean on.
As for specifics, I think the Uruguay Round has a very good chance
of making progress in some very needed areas. For example, Yeutter
and company have done a splendidjob ofkicking offthe process in the
area ofservices. He has gotten countries that I never thought would be
interested, such as Brazil, involved in the process. With respect to ag-
riculture, the problems are intense, but I think there is reason to believe
they canmake some progress. Duringthe Tokyo Round wejustcouldn't
move any further on agricultural subsidies or very far on subsidies in
general, because the time wasn't right and the only thing I could say
when we signed offwas that we'll be back anotherday. Agriculture still
needs a lot ofwork, but I think they can now make some progress in the
area ofsubsidies generally because the timing has improved. All in all,
I think we have reason to hope that over the next three to five years
something positive will come out ofthe Uruguay Round.
Moving on to the issue ofthe U.S.-CanadaFree Trade Arrangement,
I think it's worth noting thateveryone in Canada, as some ofyou know,
is well aware ofthe negotiations. It's a key political issue. In the United
States, however, I don't think anyone knows that the negotiations are
going on, including two-thirds of the members of Congress. The fact
that we're engaged in these negotiations really has been one ofthe few
things that hasn't leaked out of this Administration.
For Prime Minister Mulroney, the successful conclusion of these
negotiations is essential to his political career. Mulroney has staked a
substantial portion ofhis political prestige on the fact that we told him
that a U.S.-Canada trade agreement was a wonderful thing. And then
we promptly lost interest in it on this side. In the United States, much
ofthe burden ofsustaining and supporting the negotiations has shifted
to the private sector. Fortunately, important members ofthe American
business community, such as Ed Pratt and Jim Robinson, have stepped
in and initiated a private sector effort to try to build a bit more of a
fire under the public sector, especially the Congress, to see if we can
build a political consensus in favor ofa balanced agreement.
Let me now talk a bit about the impact of the political process on
trade issues. In my opinion, ifwe can make the political process begin
to function again effectively between the Congress and the Executive
Branch, then we can begin to grapple seriously with some ofthis coun-
try's trade and monetary problems. Otherwise, we will be unable to
cope effectively with the problems facing us in international trade and
the forces that continue to erode ourcompetitive position in the world.
Unfortunately, over the past few years the political process hasn't
worked at either the domestic orinternational levels. Without effective
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our government and the governments of our main trading partners,
there cannotbe any public supportfor good trade policy. In the absence
of public support, there is a void, and the result more often than not
is bad trade policy. I'm sorry to say that we've seen more and more
of that in recent years.
For example, while the Administration has been strong and effective
in many areas, the White House has been a nonplayer in the field of
trade despite the efforts of Brock, Yeutter, and Baldrige. Policy vac-
uums don't last for long in Washington, and the House of Represen-
tatives moved quickly in 1986 and passed a bad piece of legislation.
Fortunately, nothing came of it. In 1987, the Administration has con-
tinued to resist protectionist legislation but has resorted to a series of
ad hoc measures which have done little to remedy the country's trade
position and even less to improve trade relations with our allies.
With respect to the political climate, and I mean no offense to my
Japanese friends, I'm afraid the Japanese share much ofthe blame for
their inability, not altogether their unwillingness, but their inability and
unwillingness to deal with some of the problems their trade practices
and trade surplus create in this country. I think Japan's inability to
stem the trade costs borne by the United States has led directly to the
sharp erosion in this country's support for a good trade policy. In my
opinion, we've gone overboard on Japan bashing and retaliation, but
the Japanese have responded poorly to the problem. I am seriously
concerned that what we are dealing with today is far bigger than beef,
citrus, autos, or semiconductors, because what we are talking about
is the basic Japanese-American relationship. This relationship is pre-
cious and important to both of us.
Given this setting, it is essential that the West's leaders take charge,
consult regularly, and work together to resolve the principal conflicts
that threaten to seriously undermine world trade. On the domestic
front, it is essential that the U.S. government articulate effectively to
the American public the importanceofthe Uruguay Round. Trade must
be emphasized as a top priority. That means, ofcourse, that the United
States must face up to the underlying economic fundamentals that lead
to trade crises. The only real way to address Japanese procurement
problems and European agricultural problems is for the United States
to candidly recognize that a principal culprit of the country's trade
problems is our own domestic economic policy. While it may be po-
litically very pleasant to blame the trade deficit on foreigners because
foreigners don't vote, we're not going to solve the trade problems until
we've come to grips with our macroeconomic policies. Foreign unfair
trade practices may be a part of the U.S. trade deficit, but they are
certainly not the major cause.
So how do we come to grips with these macroeconomic policies?
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in my opinion we're not going to deal with them until the public is
ready to, andI don'tknow whenthat'sgoing to happen. U.S. politicians
of both parties are guilty of not keeping the American people fully
informed of the difficult choices that face us. It's easy to talk about
dealing with the budget deficit and how we can go about reducing it.
Unfortunately, our meager efforts have generally stopped there. When
theleadershipofthecountrygoes to theAmericanpublic withanhonest
assessment of where we are, what our problems really are, and a
sensible strategy to deal with them, they will find support. Until then,
there will never be a political consensus to deal with the subject.
The White House and the Congress must level with the American
people onthe economic steps that mustbe taken to restore a semblance
of balance to the country's fiscal policies. The budget deficit remains
an intractable issue, largely because there is a lack of political will to
deal with it firmly. With Congress distracted by trade issues and the
Iran-Contra affair and the White House trying to salvage a presidency,
there is little hope for action on the federal deficit in 1987. There is
even less likelihood of decisive action being initiated in 1988 in the
middle of what should be a hotly contested presidential election
campaign.
Unfortunately, neither the U.S. economy nor the world economy
can afford to wait for the American political system to sort itself out.
The United States cannot afford to go on being dependent on foreign
capital to finance our excessive spending. Any moves to cut this de-
pendence, however, mustbe made verycarefully, as the worldeconomy
cannot afford a U.S. austerity program. The problems we face today
simply will not go away without firm leadership and decisive policies.
Without being overly pessimistic, it is worth recalling that the U.S.
deficit has continued to grow during a period ofnear record economic
growth. If U.S. policymakers cannot manage the budget when things
are going well, what will happen when the cycle turns down? In my
opinion, it is absolutely essential that policymakers stand tall and put
the country back on a sound economic footing. Not only is a large
federal deficit unhealthy in economic terms, but in political terms it
reflects a weakness in leadership that is equally damaging. Therefore,
it is importantthatwe not squanderopportunities to make real progress
in dealing with the broad range of interrelated economic and trade
issues.
That is why I strongly believe that it is important for the Uruguay
Round to be successful. The world cannot afford to pass up this golden
opportunity to deal with the serious trade problems confronting us.
In summary, I would like to relate a few of the broader lessons I
have learned from my experience in the public and private sectors.
One: On trade andotherinternational economicissues, the Executive
Branch must speak with one voice. International economic policy-211 Trade Policy
making must receive the personal attention of the President and his
White House advisors. I can't emphasize this point enough. No foreign
nation will take our policies and negotiations seriously unless they
believe that the President is personally involved in the process.
Two: The search for new ideas is a phrase that has become mean-
ingless. The search for new policy ideas or clever strategies is not a
substitute for effective action. Trade policy in particular has been the
focus of significant study and great rhetoric during the past few years.
The country's trade position, however, has continued to deteriorate.
We must no longer postpone action.
Three: Neither the Congress nor the Administration can make good
trade policy or economic policy on their own.
And four: Partisan policy generally equals bad policy. I've addressed
the need of forging a political consensus on trade. As Trade Repre-
sentative, I worked closely and constructively with leaders of both
parties. Broad bipartisan support was essential to the drafting and
almost unanimous passage of the 1979 Trade Agreements Act in both
the House and Senate.
In conclusion, it is vital that politicians and governments recognize
that the way outofthe present trade morass begins with a commitment
to deal honestly, and, I might add, bluntly, with the political and eco-
nomic realities faced by each country. No country can go it alone, and
no country can solve its own problems without an understanding of
the problems faced by others in the world. Further, to deal with trade
disputes requires that the political process at both the domestic and
international levels function effectively, leading to political consensus.
In democracies, it is only through the political process that successful
and lasting compromises can be achieved and, once achieved, main-
tained. Our problems were not created overnight, and there are no
overnight quick fixes. But we can succeed over time with persistence.
The people in this room today have a responsibility to lead that effort.
3. Michihiko Kunihiro
International Trade Policy and
Trade Negotiations
International trade today is confronted with three major problems.
Theyare: (1) inordinate tradeimbalancesbetweenmajortradepartners,
(2) instability in exchange rates, and (3) growing debts of developing
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International trade has provided incentives for economic growth, but
it may now function to hamper economic growth if we fail to address
these problems effectively.
Inordinate Trade Imbalances between Major Trade Partners
The huge trade imbalance between Japan and the United States is
now called "intolerable" and is even described as a "threat" to the
free trade system. We can mention a number offactors that have brought
about such a huge trade imbalance. Among them, I believe, the insuf-
ficient coordination in macroeconomic policies between the two coun-
tries is most responsible.
The Ushiba-Strauss Communique of 1979 dealt with this aspect, but
the U.S. negotiators in the presentAdministration showedlittle interest
in discussing macroeconomic policy implications until recently. Per-
haps they were not inclined to be involved in demand management, or
perhaps they were wary that the Japanese negotiators might divert the
issue from market barriers.
The U.S. Congress now seems serious about reducing the budget
deficit, even if the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings requirement seems in-
creasingly unattainable. It would be helpful if Congress succeeded in
convincing the world that further budget deficit reduction would be in
train for years after fiscal year 1988.
Japan has for some years been engaged in a historic task ofrestruc-
turing its government system. It was expected to reinvigorate the pri-
vate sector by deregulations, cuts in subsidies, slimming the govern-
ment agencies, and so on. But the resources made available as a result
of these endeavors have been absorbed by another urgent national
endeavor: the reduction ofthe government debt. Under these circum-
stances, the Japanese trade negotiators were not in a very convenient
position to launch macroeconomic arguments forcefully. The defla-
tionary effect caused by the recent yen appreciation is now prompting
Japanese policymakers to try more seriously to expand domestic de-
mand. The Paris meeting of G-7 last February helped to change the
current. The immediate question is what measures Japan will be able
to announce after the 1987 budget bill has passed the Diet.
The EEC has been more consistent in bringing up macroeconomic
issues to Japan, although I am not well informed about how the issue
has been addressed between the EEC and the United States.
Instability of Exchange Rates
Since the Plaza agreement, we have learned something more than
the classic J-curve effect; the rampant fluctuations of exchange rates
paralyzes business by making planning and decision-making extremely
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A sizable appreciation of the currency forces structural adjustment
to the economy. But, the repeated fluctuations hamper necessary in-
vestment decisions, precipitating the deflationary effect caused by the
currency appreciation.
On the other hand, an excessive depreciation ofthe currency delays
industrial adjustments, entailing muchgreaterdifficulties whenindustry
eventuallyfaces the needfor the structuralchanges necessary to remain
competitive.
The flexible exchange rate very often produces overshooting, but we
have not found a feasible, better alternative.
It is agreed that better coordination of economic policies among
major countries provides a base on which the stability of exchange
rates can be sought. The policy coordination efforts envisaged in the
Tokyo Summit declaration led to the Baker-Miyazawa talks in October
1986 and the Paris talks in February 1987, but it is yet to be seen how
much each country will be prepared to bend its domestic policies for
the sake of exchange rate stabilities.
The Growing Debt of Developing Countries
The retreat of heavily indebted developing countries from interna-
tional trade is causing serious difficulties not only to those countries
themselves but also to industrial countries, particularly the United
States. The most urgent need is to alleviate the debt service burden of
the most heavily indebted countries, but they must undergo growth-
oriented structural adjustment at the same time to diversify export
income resources and to strengthen domestic supply bases. We should
not forget that the real key to the solution is to increase their export
capabilities.
On the part of the industrial countries, they should aggressively
promote structural adjustments so that they can provide more markets
for productsfrom developingcountries. Hereagain, bettercoordination
between domestic economic policies and trade policies bears particular
importance.
The Erosion of the GATT System
As reviewed so far, the measures required to deal with the three
basic problems in today's international trade are closely related to, and
require adjustments in, domestic economic policies. But, in addition,
international trade policies must assume their own responsibilities.
The basic framework ofthe postwar international trade policies has
been the GATT. Indeed, it has been instrumental in bringing about the
development of international trade, which has helped the world eco-
nomic growth. But the function of GATT has eroded over the years.
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a) frequent resort to the so-called gray measures, such as voluntary
export restraint agreements;
b) diminishing effectiveness of the dispute settlement mechanisms;
c) recourse to countertradel requirements by developing countries;
d) inability to deal with agricultural issues;
e) lack ofauthority in dealing with services and other "new" issues.
These matters are ofvital importance and warrant an early start ofthe
Uruguay Round.
Worrisome Trend in Bilateral Trade Negotiations
The Uruguay Round, however, will take a few years to conclude,
and a major trade bill will, it seems, pass the U.S. Congress in a few
months. Perhaps it is too early to predict the final shape of the trade
legislation, but we are concerned that whatever may happen in trade
statistics and trade negotiations in the coming weeks and months will
affectcongressionaldecisions onU.S. trade policy. Itis a right moment,
indeed, to look back on what has been happening in trade negotiations
in recent years.
Fair Trade
I shall start with the "fairtrade" issue. In my memory, it was during
the course ofthe 1984 election campaign that the U.S. Administration
began to juxtapose "fair" with "free" in pronouncing its trade policy.
The policy sharpened its edge on September 23, 1985, when President
Reagan announced his new trade initiatives. There should be no ob-
jection to seeking fairness in international trade. But the basic problem
ofthe U.S. approachis thefact thatthe USTRwho negotiates to correct
"unfairness" is also authorized to determine if "fairness" is achieved
or not. He is even authorized to determine how much countermeasure
will be necessary to restore "fairness." In the eyes of foreign trade
partners, this procedure is "unfair" in itself. They insist, therefore,
that the issue should be dealt with in accordance with the GATT.
The U.S. negotiators complain that the GATT procedure takes too
much time. It is true. We should strengthen the dispute settlement
function ofthe GATT. By nature, the countermeasure to restitute "un-
fairness" will not offer compensation. This makes it all the more nec-
essary to place the whole procedure under the GATT discipline. As
the U.S. Administration frequently wields Section 301 against almost
all major trading partners, the American public gets the impression
that everybody around the United States is unfair and develops an
antagonistic attitude toward major trading partners. Another concern
is that Section 301, especially if its retaliatory threshold is further
lowered, will become "Cheap 201" or "backdoors to protectionism."
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Voluntary Export Restraints
Another method used to circumvent the GATT scrutiny and the
burden of compensation has been the "voluntary export restraint"
(VER). At an early stage, it had the merit of limiting the damage of
trade restriction to one or two exporting countries, rather than sub-
jugating all trade partners to a nondiscriminatory import restriction
that might otherwise have been applied. The VER is also a quick fix,
isolating the restriction in a particular sector, avoiding a general pro-
tectionist policy. On the part of the exporting countries, the VER has
the merit of cartelizing exporters to their own benefit.
Since then, the VER has proliferated in terms ofboth products and
countries involved. Although it always starts as a temporary or even
an emergency measure, the VER has an intrinsic nature of perpetua-
tion. The textile agreement does have reluctant GATT blessing and is
subjecttoGATT discipline, ifonly nominally, butalmostall otherVERs
are short of transparency and GATT discipline. As the VER become
a mainstream type oftrade restriction, rather than an exception, third-
party countries become concerned about its adverse effects on them.
The automobile is a case in point. The U.S. Administration maintains
the position thatit no longerasks for the restraint, butthe congressional
reaction will be more than obvious if Japan terminates the VER on
autos. Under the present circumstances, Japan has no other choice,
and yet the Japanese auto industry is blamed for opting for restraint
to maintain higher prices. The fact is that the industry wants to dis-
continue the restraint because the industry is keenly aware that idling
on the quota system erodes its vitality. The EEe, on the other hand,
claims that Japan's VER agreement with the United States is shifting
Japan's auto exports to the EEC market. Actually, in the U.S. market,
Japanese auto exports may have reached a saturation point in view of
the increased supply from Japanese factories inside the United States
and the price effect ofthe yen appreciation. But it is the political heat
in the Congress that is preventing Japan from terminating the VER at
this juncture.
At any rate, the VER needs a thorough review, and it also calls for
a review of the GATT safeguard mechanism.
Industrial Overproduction
It seems GATT is confronted with the new situation of industrial
overproduction as a result ofthe worldwide industrialization helped by
technological development. We see such a trend in textiles, steel, ship-
building, semiconductors, and so on. To cope with the textile over-
production, the Multi-Fibers Agreement was introduced, but there is
a growing discontent about it on the part ofthe developing countries.216 J.D. Richardson/R.S. Strauss/Me Kunihiro/E.T. Pratt, Jr.
For steel, both the United States and the EEC formed de facto inter-
national cartels on their own. As regards shipbuilding, the OECD has
been trying for an informal coordination whose effect is not altogether
clear. Perhaps the waning oftraditional shipyards in countries, includ-
ing Japan, may bethe inevitable eventualityas far as exportis concerned.
At one stage, a U.S. official suggested that we should refrain from
extendingthe EX-1M creditto finance a new steelmill in Koreabecause
the whole world is suffering from excess capacity. Was it a right ap-
proach? Even if it were, what should we do about other industries
where the catching up of newly industrialized countries is bringing
about excess facilities?
The semiconductor gives us a very perplexing problem. For the mo-
ment, Japan concluded an ad hoc agreement with the United States to
deal with today's singular situation, causing a great deal ofdispleasure
in other countries, particularly the EEC. It seems that much of the
problem derives from the fact that Japan invested too much in the new
chip facilities. Whether the estimate of the Japanese industry on the
future demand was right or not, the fact remains that the increased
production ofmore efficient semiconductors at very low prices will be
possible by means ofa comparatively small amount ofinvestment and
with relatively simple skilled labor, probably in many countries other
than Japan. Can we stop it? Should we?
Other high-tech products may follow suit. A few highly educated
scientists and gifted entrepreneurs in developing countries can start a
business, possibly in joint venture with foreign firms, with facilities
purchased at a relatively low cost and with standardized labor locally
available, and produce products that will be able to compete well with
those from industrial countries. Isn't it a dream-corne-true story for
many developing countries?
Yes, but the industrial countries don't know for sure yet what to do
with this new situation. One orthodox answer is for the developed
countries not to do anything but endeavor toward higher technological
progress. A pragmatic approach might be to authorize importing coun-
tries to limit imports of that kind of product to a certain level, for
example, 25 percent of the domestic consumption, while prohibiting
any restrictive measures below that level. Of course, I support the
former approach, but one might argue that the latter may be better
than all the mutual recriminations and threats ofdestroying the world
trading system that we are experiencing these days.
In any event, we should always bear in mind that the whole purpose
of international trade policy is economic growth of all countries. The
trade policy advocated by leading industrialized countries should not
have the effect ofdenying industrial growth to developing countries.217 Trade Policy
Agriculture
Another situation of overproduction with which international trade
policy is confronted is in agriculture.
It is mainly the product of heavy subsidies in developed countries,
particularly the EEC and the United States, although technological
progress also accounts for it. The increasingly heavy agricultural sub-
sidy is imposing an unbearable budgetary burden in both the EEC and
the United States. It is rendering damage to farmers in countries like
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada. It is also causing distortion in
agriculture in developing countries. We should urgently discuss some
concerted actions, first to freeze the subsidy level and then to reduce
it progressively.
The budgetary constraint will work as leverage for reducing subsi-
dies, but our attempt should go further than overcoming the budgetary
difficulties, because otherwise we would not achieve much more than
a standstill.
The immediate problem in the agricultural trade policy is the export
subsidy, but it may be difficult to discuss the export subsidy entirely
separately from agricultural subsidy in general.
It is often said that, in agricultural policy, every country is a sinner.
It may be that, all for political reasons, none ofus will be able to save
ourselves completely from this sin for a long time. For all practical
purposes, we may have to work out agricultural trade policy on that
premise. If so, we had better admit it and try to agree on a common
rule that is different, to the extent necessary, from the one applied to
industrial goods. In the particular case ofagricultural trade, I am per-
sonally inclined to lean to the "minimum access" approach as sug-
gested in the GATT study.
Reciprocity
Finally, we should touch upon the reciprocity issue. It is natural that
we insist on reciprocity as a general guiding principle in trade negoti-
ations. But what we should go after is reciprocity in opportunity for
overall trade benefit. Ifwe demand reciprocity on a sectoral basis and
retaliate when the sectoral reciprocity is not given, the spiral ofretal-
iation will lead to contraction in the total trade.
The so-called aggressive reciprocity on a sectoral basis is advocated
for the reason that otherwise the importingcountry thatmaintains trade
barriers would not feel compelled to eliminate them. But the recent
argument pronouncedbyu.S. negotiators on someofthe issues sounds
more emphatic on countermeasures than mutually opening the market.
The remedy, ifnecessary, should be sought in accordance with Article
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Internationaltrade is experiencingits mostcrucialyearin thepostwar
era. In my view, the realignment of exchange rates has already pro-
duced a definite change in trend, only it does not show up in statistics
in U.S. dollars. Japan's real GNP growth last year was sustained by
the contribution ofdomestic demand making up for the negative con-
tribution ofexternal demand. It will be a matter ofanother few months
when we will see a marked improvement in the international trade
balance also in U.S. dollar figures.
What I am very much worried about is the growing impatience in
the Congress and the irritated attitude of the U.S. trade negotiators.
On the part ofthe Japanese, many are feeling they are being penalized
with the appreciation ofthe yen because theirindustry is sufferingfrom
heavy loss of profit and increasing unemployment. But they should
take it to heart that just enduring the yen appreciation is not enough.
I think the experience in the past year and a halfhas made the Japanese
realize that, unless they import more, they will have to face a stronger
yen which will inflict damage on Japanese industry.
And yet the U.S. Congress appears to be intent on "tough" legis-
lative actions and urging the Administration to take further "tough"
actions on Japan, and perhaps on a number of other countries with
which it has a large trade deficit as well. The rhetoric used is even
assuming the sound ofvengeance. Policies like this will in the end have
an effect of antagonizing America's trade partners who are, in fact,
time-honored customers of American products. Indeed, we are at a
very crucial moment when we all should see the whole problem in its
true perspective.
Note
Opinions expressed in this paper are the personal opinions of the writer.
4. Edmund T. Pratt, Jr.
Changing Realities: The Need for Business-
Government Cooperation
When Marty called me a number ofmonths ago and asked me to come
down here, my first reaction was that he probably had the wrong Pratt.
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sessions of economists and former government leaders and the like.
As a matter offact, I haven't even been to a summit meeting!
And it's a little strange, when you stop to think about it from the
businessman's point ofview, that you don'tfind more ofus represented
at sessions like this. We could argue that the macroeconomic policies,
debt concerns, and financial arrangements that are under consideration
are primarily concerned with creating an atmosphere in which business
can flourish or fail to flourish.
Therefore, after a little thought, I agreed to come-with some trepi-
dation. And I have to say, I'm much appreciative for the invitation. I
thought the debates and discussions yesterday were very, very re-
vealing and interesting and, therefore, very helpful and important to
me.
As I thought about it though, the idea ofgetting more businessmen
involved in these discussions, although it's rational, may notbe as good
as our old policy. Under that policy we left issues like those discussed
during this conference to the academics, governments, and bankers
and then complained like heck when they blew it.
As a matter offact though, I think it is fair to say that the business
community has come a long way from earlier days when we relied on
that strategy. The Business Roundtable, the NAM, the Chamber of
Commerce, and all the various business organizations overrecentyears
have made landmark changes in the way the business community ap-
proaches ourrelationship with otherpolicymaking members ofsociety.
Perhaps one ofthe mostcritical things thathas happened in thebusiness
community during my membership is our realization that all members
need to be more involved in policy issues that impact us. If there is
anything more critical to our country during an age of keen world
competition, it is the fact that our competitiveness depends on better
integration and cooperation with academia, government, and otherele-
ments ofour society. We in the business community have the resources
now to join in these debates and have been trying to influence policy.
I would like to follow up on Mike Blumenthal's comments and pro-
vide another businessman's perspective on how major U.S. companies
like ours approach discussions on such policy issues as trade and in-
vestment. A little bit ofbackground may be interesting and necessary
to help understand how we approach the current debates.
Most of the major U.S. companies, indeed, I guess, in the world
these days, are multinational companies. I've been a part of two of
them. I spent the first half ofmy career with IBM and the second half
with Pfizer. Our company, like Mike's, could well be considered a
classic multinationalcompany. Two-thirdsofouremployees arelocated
outside the United States. We have about 160 manufacturing plants,
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sales and somewhat less than half ofour profits come from operations
outside the United States.
And why is that? Why did companies like Pfizer and IBM over the
last thirty or forty years aggressively go abroad and become part of
the local communities ratherthan stayingathome and exporting, which
really would have been much simpler. We try to explain this to our tax
people, and they say we did it for tax reasons. As a matter offact, we
did it for a very simple reason-it was the only way we could do
business. We had currency problems in those days, and we had balance
of trade problems, too. Almost every.country in the world, when we
started strongly going abroad from America in the years after World
War II, had inadequate dollars to pay for our products. We would have
been nowhere had we not found a way to solve that problem, not by
negotiation but by unilateral reaction to the conditions from the busi-
nessman's point of view.
As a result ofthat, we now find ourselves with operations in nearly
every country, in nearly every currency in the world. And we are
therefore affected in a different way than those organizations that de-
pend on trade and the relative balance ofexchange rates to determine
whether they can sell their products or not. We have effects from
changing currency values, but they are more accounting effects than
"ability to sell" effects.
An interesting figure that opens most Congressmen's eyes is that
approximately 80 percent ofall manufactured American export goods
are done by multinational companies. And approximately 40 percent
of all U.S. manufactured goods actually are exported to the foreign-
owned subsidiaries of American companies.
These figures begin to give you the feeling of what the "trade"
situation really is for many of us and for our country in general. We
believe that the argument can well be made, as it has always been
made, for freer trade, but it is justas important to have freer economic
relationships. International economic cooperation, the subject of this
conference, comes closer to describing what it is we have now. We
don't have just international trade, we have international economic
relationships.
Given the emergence of this new environment, the American busi-
ness community has recognized tpat the GATT of the past really is
inadequately focused to handle the problems we have relative to in-
ternational business. Tariffs and trade barriers are important to us, but
they're not the critical issues today.
Investments are now much more important to most of us; that is,
the ability to continuetoinvestandtooperatein othercountries without
being discriminated against. We've spent a lot of time in the last few
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Services, investment rules, protection of intellectual property rights
are for most of us the key issues of the day, not barriers and tariffs.
Certainly the importance of all of these things, international trade
as well as international investment, we believe, is a win-win situation.
Again, our discussion yesterday came to the rather obvious conclusion
that a different kind of investment is needed in debt-ridden countries
where traditional sources ofmoney to relieve debtburdens in thefuture
are less available. Strangely enough, in spite of the problems of their
balance sheets, most of us in business are still willing to take the
required risks and to invest sizable funds in these countries, given
halfway reasonablerules in orderto make those investments worthwhile.
Although macroeconomic policies play a more significant role in
creating a favorable business environment today, trade policies do re-
main important to us. We continue to work in those vineyards, as we
have for many years.
After World War II, the first really serious signs of protectionism
began to emerge in the United States about twenty years ago. Certain
industries began to be severely impacted by the industrial revival of
major foreign competitors ofthe past and the emergence ofthe lesser
developed countries. Thoseofus in thecompaniesthathadgone abroad
years earlier, and to whom foreign markets were a critical part of our
operation, formed an organization called the Emergency Committee
for American Trade (ECAT). It included about sixty-five of the major
American companies, a very large chunk of our industrial capacity.
It was created as an "emergency committee" to lobby Congress and
the government as they began to consider the first protectionist activ-
ities that we had seen in a number of years. The ECAT companies
recognized that somebody was going to pay for protectionist moves
(very likely the sixty-five of us) and that it was in America's own
interest, and certainly in ours, that we do something about it.
Interestingly enough, that committee was formed and we all put up
some funds to create it with the agreement that we would get in there,
do the job, and self-destruct. I've been Chairman ofECAT for the last
twelve years. It still keeps going, and after over twenty years, we've
wondered whether we should rename it, since the Emergency Com-
mittee for American Trade perhaps is not descriptive ofa twenty-year-
old situation. We've concluded, however, that we've had a continuing
emergency for all that time. ECAT continues to be extremely involved
today and, I believe, has played a major role in holding off many
undesirable protectionist activities.
The U.S. private-public sector advisory network also plays an im-
portant role in the development of U.S. trade policy. Created by the
Congress, the growing advisory network provides private sector input
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a lot of sense since the trade negotiators are negotiating our rules for
international economic relationships. This advisory group embraces
more thana thousand people who are actively involved in theprocess-
labor leaders, lawyers, agricultural people, academics, business lead-
ers, and so on. Representatives ofthis advisory network attend major
international meetings, such as the Punta del Este meeting.
American business has generally always supported GATT-the ob-
vious logic of what GATT is trying to achieve is clear to us. Having
said that, it would be unfair not to tell you that the general feeling of
the U.S. business community is that GATT, in general, has not been
particularly good for America. In every negotiation, no matter how
relatively successful, our country gave up more than it got. I realize
that people in every country probably feel that way, but the facts
suggest that in the aggregate our country has freer conditions thanjust
about any other.
During the days ofprevious trade negotiations, our conceding more
than we got was viewed as a reasonable outcome. It could almost be
visualized as part of the Marshall Plan syndrome of the time. It was
in our long-term interest to reach out to the countries that needed more
help. But the situation has changed. Now many businesses in this
country are in trouble. There is a growing concern that any further
negotiations not proceed along that same path.
When the idea ofthe current Uruguay Round came up, members of
the government's advisory network were canvassed on their reactions
to a new round. You won't be surprised to hear that what we got, at
best, was lukewarm agreement that another round was a good thing.
Why? Because everyone was concerned that we were likely to lose
more than we gained out of such a negotiation, if past history is any
guide.
Indeed, the same reaction is what's behind the seemingly uncon-
cerned attitude of American business leaders about the negotiations
for a U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. To our credit, even with the
doubts that we have, American business has never opposed trying to
promote trade agreements. But here again, when asked for our views,
there was very lukewarm enthusiasmfor such talks. The business com-
munity in general does not believe that the Canadians are likely to go
very far in giving up things that they would have to give up to make
such a negotiation of interest to us and in order for us to give up
whatever we must in return.
Given the lukewarm support among American business for a new
GATT round, we told our Administration we would support it only
with certain provisions. In addition to the normal discussion items of
thefunctioning ofthe GATT systemitself, agriculture clearlyis a critical
item that needs serious attention in a multilateral framework. Second,
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rules, and intellectual property, we would not support a new round of
negotiations. The U.S. government did agree to those conditions and,
in fact, has been particularly responsive in these critical areas that are
new to GATT.
On investment, for example, we were never before able to get an
American Administration to do more than say they weren't against
direct foreign investment by U.S companies. Yet, we got a strong
statement ofsupport from the Reagan Administration, not only on the
importance ofinvestment but also on services and intellectual property
protection. In a country whose competitiveness has been threatened
by recent events, certainly our strongest suit is our innovation and
technical competence.
The business community has also received increasing support from
this Administration on bilateral trade actions against countries that
disregard intellectual property rights and condone unfair trade and
investment practices. While I strongly believe in the multilateral ap-
proach, it is also very clear to me that many of the major gains in the
short run will continue to be on a bilateral basis.
However, some believe the Congress is trying to take U.S. trade
policy too far on a bilateral basis, to the detriment of our multilateral
obligations. The business community still has a moderating influence
with respect to Congress and potential trade legislation. Nevertheless,
we are in a much more aggressive mood concerning the role the Ex-
ecutive Branch should have in carrying out the existing rules and reg-
ulations relative to fair trade and, indeed, to critical economic policies.
We don't understand, for example, why we should continue to sustain
intolerable deficits with strong countries, particularly with Japan. We
don't understand why we should continue to tolerate discrimination
against us, even in the developing countries, which undoubtedly need
special concessions from us in some areas. But the argument can be
made, I think rightfully, that conditions leading to freer investment and
trade flows with the developing countries are good for both sides. We
should not continue to tolerate their closing us out.
After years of blaming the government for any problems U.S. in-
dustry had, now government leaders and others are pointing the finger
more and more at the "competitiveness" ofU.S. industry and arguing
that it's really the main issue. A recent NBER study showed that
American multinational companies have sustained their competitive-
ness in terms ofholding onto their market share ofworld trade exports.
This suggests that American management per se has not gone down
for the count. It also suggests that there are some special problems
related to our country and its ability to compete in today's world mar-
kets that are perhaps more significant than American management itself.
The business community understands that the key problems today
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as strongly as it could from all ofits organizations that the government
get its act together on fiscal policy.
Finally, as far as American competitiveness is concerned, there is a
whole list of domestic items that are critical to making us more com-
petitive that have nothing to do with foreign trade. For instance, our
export administration laws, where we regularly shoot ourselves in the
foot to try to achieve some unachievable issue of human relations or
security, have been proven over the years not to work and have been
a sizable detriment to our operations. We have antitrust laws that tend
to make us less competitive. Our tax policy has never put its effect on
international competitiveness as a high priority, and our last tax bill
was basically anticompetitive.
One ofthe critical issues we face which alone can end up making us
noncompetitive in the world is the issue oftort reform. We have a huge
number of lawyers in my company now, and it's not really that big a
company. The millions ofdollars and huge amount oftime that is spent
fighting offthe growing hoards ofambulance-chasing lawyers is enough
by itself to make you noncompetitive.
We probably need law changes, as much as we hate to say it, relative
to the abusive takeover situation. In general, the extreme cases are
negative to our economy and a diversion ofresources in the American
business community.
In summary, the U.S. multinational business community has rec-
ognized the new global economic environment in which it operates.
We are responding to the challenging new policy issues facing us. Trade
policy and competitiveness in American business need to also claim a
higher priority in our government's action than they ever have before.
The cooperation of policymakers in all segments of our society is a
key factor to our continued economic vitality and competitiveness.
Summary of Discussion
Blumenthalonce askedformer SecretaryofState Christian Herderwhy
he came to the USTR from the State Department. Herder responded
that he liked politics best, and that in his experience there are more
politics wrapped up in trade issues than anywhere else. Trade, Blu-
menthal stated, is a political issue. Blumenthal argued that to make
meaningful progress on trade problems it is important to have relative
economic stability and growth, but that it is essential to have both
domestic and international political consensus. In the current inter-
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and exchange rate swings make successful trade negotiations much
harder to achieve. Blumenthal felt that the last truly successful trade
negotiations were the Kennedy Round because the key form of pro-
tection under negotiation was still tariffs. Much of the early postwar
success with trade negotiations followed from the willingness of the
United States to give up more than it would extract. This was true
throughout the 1950s and early 1960s.
To this, Anthony Solomon added an anecdote of his own. As the
Kennedy Round negotiations were concluded, Lyndon Johnson held a
cabinet meeting in which several advisers discouraged him from sign-
ing. Many of the prospective trade flow numbers presented at the
meeting showed the United States would not be getting as much as it
was giving. At one point, Solomon mentioned to the President that the
assumptions behind the numbers were very arbitrary and that minor
modifications would easily yield a different bottom line. Johnson said
nothing, but at the endofthe meeting announced his decision: he would
approve the Kennedy Round on the condition that Solomon "fix up
the numbers."
Blumenthal also noted that at the time tariffs were the major form
of protection. Governments held to the letter of the agreement but
found new ways, which are far more difficult to regulate, to protect
the industries of their choice. The protectionism typified by the agri-
cultural policies of the United States and the Common Market has
turned out to be more costly than ever imagined. Blumenthal was
skeptical but did not rule outthe possibility for progress at the Uruguay
Round. He felt that any meaningful pact would require specificity and
new enforcement machinery. The best that can happen until 1989 is
that nothing happen.
Strauss assured Blumenthal that the nastiest provisions ofthe Gep-
hardtbill, suchas legal recourse to treble damages for industries injured
by imports, would be dropped in conference. The modified Gephardt
bill, which is likely to get through the House of Representatives and
the conference committee, will focus primarily on countries that have
large bilateral surpluses vis-a.-vis the United States. Gephardt's pres-
idential ambitions have allowed the unpopularity of an aggressively
protectionist stance to soften the bill. He wants to finesse this bill
without looking like a hawkish protectionist, but at the same time he
needs to look good in Iowa. Richardson added that the bill had the
positive and important feature that it would extend the negotiating
authority for trade talks beyond December.
Blumenthal defended recognizing in the bill the question ofbilateral
imbalances. He argued that older concepts, such as reciprocity, were
no longer as relevant as before. Even assuming that Japan's trading
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unsustainable. Reciprocity and fairness are important in their own right,
but, ultimately, trade is a political issue.
Schultze was less sanguine about the trade bill, even though its most
monstrous features have been removed. Schultze believed that pro-
visions oftrade legislation thatrequire the Presidentto imposepenalties
unless he declares that doing so would be contrary to the national
interest are not a good thing. Each time the President refuses to take
the hardline position, he will expend some political capital. Eventually,
it will become necessary for him to make an example out ofa case in
order to demonstrate that he is willing to act. This loophole is not
without costs. Schultze pointed out that seemingly innocuous details
of a bill often turn out to be costly. The definition of dumping in the
1974 Trade Act as sales below full cost has become a big problem.
Strauss responded that concerns about the Gephardt bill voiced by
Schultze and Blumenthal were justified. The United States will now
pay a price for the Administration's refusal to reverse the budget deficit
and the rise ofthe dollar. But one must confront reality: there is going
to be trade legislation. The only question that remains is what kind of
bill we will have. He thought that the Administration will get involved
when the bill is in conference. Waiting until such a late stage may prove
to be a mistake.
Branson seconded the notion that this bill is moderate. The shift in
emphasis to an active trade policy based on opening foreign markets,
away from a reactive policy ofclosing domestic markets, is desirable.
A likely outcome, one more important for politicians than for econo-
mists, is that the U.S./Japan bilateral balance will be i~proved.
Richardson was more optimistic about the medium-run outlook for
trade policy coordination. He felt that there is a grvwing emphasis in
trade policy onmultinational interests, laborinterests, and GATT codes
instead of MTNs over tariffs. There is interest in a safeguards code
that would alleviate back-door escape-clause proceedings via unfair-
trade remedies. We therefore need not be so bleak about the medium-
run possibilities for improved trade coordination, which would include
the Japanese.
Sachs emphasized that large trade imbalances are ultimately a mac-
roeconomic problem. Both the U.S. and Japanese current accounts
have changed dramatically over the past five years, while commercial
policies have remained virtually the same. Japanese savings as a per-
centage of GNP has not changed over the past six years. Instead,
private and public investment have fallen by 1 and 3 percent of GNP,
respectively. IfJapanese macro policies are to blame, whatcan be done
to reverse them? First, Sachs suggested that Japan reverse the drive
for domestic financial market liberalization. Most of the controls that
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Japan. Second, Japan has room for fiscal expansion. Third, the Mi-
yakawa reforms could be explored more actively. There is no serious
workbeing undertakenin Japanto ascertaintheeffects thattax changes
and land use changes might have on the interest rate or savings. While
Japan is confused about a course ofaction, the United States continues
to pound the table over trade issues which do not speak to the heart
ofthe problem. Several participants agreed that the trade problem was
really a macroeconomic issue.
Feldstein added that the Japanese capital outflow was not only pri-
vate: about one halfofthe net outflow from the second quarterof 1986
to the first quarter of 1987 was generated by purchases of U.S. assets
by the Bank of Japan. Indeed, net purchases of dollar assets by the
Bank of Japan in January 1987 were $9 billion, a figure larger than
Japan's trade surplus in that month.
Strauss felt that in spite of the furor over trade, Congress had not
overreacted. The United States may be frustrated by Japan, but the
Japanese feel equally put upon. Each day C-span carries the speeches
ofcongressmen trying to please theirconstituents. Theirrhetoric rarely
finds its way into policy, but audiences in Japan rightly think that the
United States is nuts. SuchTV diplomacy is becominga serious problem.
Kunihiro asserted that Japan regarded as vital their relations with
the United States, and that they were willing to make sacrifices to
maintain a good relationship. Japan has no intention of undermining
U.S. industry: they want the United States to be strong. Kunihiro felt
that Section 301 tends to be counterproductive because it generates
moral accusations which are often unfair in the eyes ofthe trade part-
ners and that the Japanese would better understand if the recourse
were made to the 201 cases filed in the United States, the avenue open
to U.S. industries damaged by imports. He wondered, however, if
justice had been done in the U.S. retaliation for alleged Japanese non-
compliance with the semiconductor agreement.
Kunihiro also offered his comments on the semiconductor agree-
ment. He acknowledged that the 100 percent tariff placed on $300
million ofimports is a reaction to a growing frustration with Japan and
that semiconductors themselves are not the only issue. The timing is
unfortunate, in that considerable changes are already taking place in
Japan. He felt that Japanese negotiators interpreted the semiconductor
agreement as offering more latitude than the United States was com-
fortable with, particularly in third-country markets. The United States
did warn Japan that a time limit for compliance had elapsed, but the
Japanese were not convinced that all avenues had been pursued. Ku-
nihiro was not optimistic about the future.
Blumenthalfelt that the United States would have to pound the table
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trade matters it seems that logic is useless and facts are irrelevant. He
felt that Japan's confusion is a political reality and must be confronted.
The fact is that the bilateral imbalance is egregious, and Japan must
be convinced ofthis. What the Japanese choose to do to eliminate the
current account surplus is their problem; they will act when it is in
their interest to act.
Strauss suggested that Blumenthal had overstated his case. First,
the Japanese need not bring their current account into balance; their
surplus could be sent, for instance, to the LDCs. Second, bilateral
balances do not really matter as much as some seem to perceive. De
MenU concurred that the situation with Japan should not be viewed as
a bilateral problem. He speculated that if the dollar fell to 120 yen by
the summer, we might expect to see a significant reduction in Japan's
current account. Blumenthal agreed with Strauss that a Japanese cur-
rent accountofzero is notrequired, butreiterated his view thatbilateral
imbalances of such magnitude were politically untenable.
Fischer commented that the rising yen helps ease the disparity be-
tween savings and investment, not only by increasing Japanese demand
for foreign products but also by reducing income in Japan relative to
its trading partners. A reduction in income forces an increase in gov-
ernment spending and lowers savings more than proportionately, thereby
helping to reduce the current account surplus. Fischer also made the
point that while bilateral balances are not important in principle, the
United States is a good candidate to be close to bilateral balance with
Japan. Japan is a major importer ofgoods, such as raw materials, oil,
and agricultural goods, which we export. Feldstein added that if the
United States were to drop its restriction on shipping oil from Alaska
the perception of the bilateral balance problem would be reduced.
Rosett spoke as a U.S. consumer who has bought, and bought cheaply,
many Japanese products. He wondered whether any politicians would
capitalize on the support from consumers to continue the availability
of cheap imports. Greenspan underscored the fact that it is very hard
to hit Japan without hitting the U.S. consumer where it hurts. There
may be a big backlash when the prices of these products double.
Attali shared Blumenthal's view that the imbalances are so large as
to be a predominantly political problem. In the coming months the
solution will be found more through a continued depreciation of the
dollar than through any changes in commercial policy. He went on to
say that the trade issue for the United States is the tip of the iceberg
and that underlying economic reforms must be made. He compared
the current situation ofthe United States with that ofthe United King-
dom in the early twentieth century. Perhaps a kind ofreverse Miyazawa
report should be written for the United States, detailing desirable changes
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are going. In any event, solutions to trade issues will not be found in
trade legislation.
Marston was encouraged to hear the blame for trade imbalances
placed primarily on macroeconomic matters. Suppose, he suggested,
that the macroeconomic problems were solved and that exchange rates
were stabilized at an appropriate level. He was curious whether Ed
Pratt thought the United States would be able to compete in high-tech
areas. Research by Paul Krugman indicates that U.S. firms were blocked
from competing in the Japanese market for 16K semiconductor chips.
This strategy gave Japan a foothold and allowed them to overtake the
United States in subsequent chip designs.
Pratt responded by saying that the United States continues to retain
its advantages in many high-tech areas and that it spends more on
researchanddevelopmentthandoes Japan. A policy ofblockingforeign
products is not new there. Unlike most of the rest ofEast Asia, there
are no U.S. automobiles in Japan. On the other hand, his company,
Pfizer, has been successfulin getting into Japanese markets by investing
there inste~d oftrying to only export to Japan. Nevertheless, the out-
come of Japan's protectionist policies has been to keep imports out
once they have capacity in place. We have mistakenly allowed Japan
to do this. Blumenthal added that the Japanese really have not been
so successful in computers. Unisys is one of the largest producers in
Japan. But for the difficulty in reaching Japanese markets, Unisys
would have been even bigger.
Ruggiero agreed with Blumenthal that it will be hard to sign any
trade agreement whose intention is to expand the scope ofthe system
at a time of such worldwide economic uncertainty. Nevertheless, one
need not be uniformly pessimistic. For example, great progress can be
made on the Common Market agricultural program. There is a con-
sensus building that the current situationis unsustainable, and the ECC
is already beginning to tackle the problem.
De Menilfelt that trade issues canalso spill overto affect investment.
An example would be Fujitsu'sfailed attemptto acquire Fairchild Semi-
conductor from Schlumberger. The intimidation of Fujitsu was a mis-
takefor the United States; a revitalized Fairchild would have beengood
for employment here. He felt that Fairchild's competitors created enough
emotion about the transaction that it was no longer a business decision.
McNamar said that once an issue had reached a kind of bumper-
sticker mentality, it was hard to control. Hence, the unwarranted focus
on the bilateral imbalance with Japan or the Schlumberger-Fairchild
affair. He thought that the current U.s. strategy of using a bilateral
agreement between the United States and Canada on services as a
model for the Uruguay Round was not a good one. A better approach
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He pointed out the contradiction between the current U.S. negotiating
emphasis on open investment rules and the U.S. reaction to the pro-
posed Schlumberger sale of Fairchild to the Japanese.
Gergen asked Strauss what kind of leadership we could expect in
1988. He was doubtful that in two years we will have solved the budget
problem; candidates seemwilling to make too many campaignpromises
for lower taxes and higher agricultural subsidies. The United States
needs leadership, and those running are not inspiring.
Strauss agreed that there will be excessive bidding for the protec-
tionist vote and that tax commitments will be made which shouldn't
be fulfilled. He regretted that, their importance notwithstanding, eco-
nomic issues will take a backseat. The next presidential election and
foregoing primaries will be decided by issues such as abortion, ERA,
Aids, and even whether the U.S. embassy should be located in Tel
Aviv or Jerusalem. When these are the issues ofthe day, it is hard to
get the best people to seek office and win. He felt that neither the
Republicans nor the Democrats had put up their best candidates for
1988.
The thought ofletting Iowa and New Hampshire narrow the field is
crazy, and the incentives to make campaign promises that should not
be kept are overwhelming. While the unknown candidate needs the
early primary as a means ofgaining notoriety, Strauss felt that the loss
ofthe dark horse candidate is a worthy sacrifice for making the entire
process more rational. He suggested that Sam Nunn is possibly the
most capable man the Democrats could nominate, but that Nunn couldn't
get votes in Iowa. Perhaps it would not be long before a frontrunner
adopted the strategy of not going to Iowa at all. Perhaps this is why
Cuomo dropped out.
Kunihiro said that he had listened to the criticisms, warnings, and
advice of the conference participants. He realized that the political
clockwas runningfasterthantheeconomicclock. TheMiyazawareport
has been and would be influential in changing the Japanese way of
thinking. It would raise awareness that 40,000 steel workers, shipping
workers, etc., will be unemployed in the years to come if nothing is
done. Kunihiro stressed the effects ofthe high yen: an exodus ofpro-
duction from Japan, reductions in employment, an increase in imports
ofmanufactured products beginning in the fourth quarter of 1986. All
ofthese are working as a strong lever for structural adjustment. While
manufacturing imports from the United States have not increased sub-
stantially, imports from other countries have. There is no reason why
the United States shouldn't do as well if U.S. firms take the Japanese
market seriously. He agreed that the current bilateral imbalance with
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to reduce it. The overall surplus of Japan, however, is partly due to
the reduction in mineral fuel prices, which alone improved the current
account by $19 billion last year.
Prall, in closing, reiterated his admiration for Japan. He looked
forward to the opportunity of solving the problems together.